THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly, and lost among the host—as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—The Voice of the Silence

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"THUS HAVE I HEARD"—

The Republican form of government is the highest form of government, but because of this it requires the highest type of human nature—a type nowhere at present existing.

HERBERT SPENCER

As we are penning these few lines all Indians are preparing to celebrate, in the pomp of joy, India's emergence as a Republic into the world of politics. This is to take place on Thursday—Thor's Day—the 26th of January. May the influence of the presiding Regent of the day, Brihaspati (Brahmanaspati) "the father of the Gods" prove auspicious! Greece reverenced him as Zeus, the chief of the Olympian Gods who shook "his ambrosial curls" to say no or gave "the nod" of his approval in proclaiming the fate of individuals and peoples. Less than a week later, on Monday, the 30th, all who love India and the Cause of Truth will bemoan in holy remembrance the Martyrdom of the Father of the Nation, which is made up of Hindus and Muslims, Christians and Jews, Parsis and others.

Gandhiji was the architect of the Republic. He was not allowed to live to see the consummation of his noble and unsullied patriotism. Irreligious fanaticism killed the body in which the soul dwelt—the soul which Lives, and it cannot fail to bless the country which Gandhiji served with many sacrifices.

As coincidence would have it—we call it Karma—between these two dates falls the birthday of Thomas Paine on the 29th of January. Paine played a magnificent part in creating the great American Republic, now the United States of America. In his Last Will and Testament, drawn up on 18th January 1809, Paine wrote:—

I have lived an honest and useful life to mankind; my time has been spent in doing good and I die in perfect

composure and resignation to the Will of my Creator, God.

Similar are numerous thoughts and acts of these two builders—Gandhiji and Paine. Both belong to the Immortals. It looks certain that the influence of the former will touch the human heart more deeply than did that of the great pamphleteer who awoke the American people to their destiny by wielding not the sword but the pen. And his *Age of Reason* is read by many even today.

But to turn to India, the New Republic. Will it incarnate as Aryavarta, the Land of the Nobles? Will the ancient Soul once again embody the virtues of Truth and Compromise, Patience and Non-violence? Four are the outstanding virtues with which Gandhiji won the freedom of India. Truth was his God with whom he never compromised, though on every necessary occasion he displayed the spirit of holy compromise founded on reason, justice and mercy. His compromises were not those of the politician and the diplomat, the trader or the beggar, but of the saint of tolerance and the wise man of insight. His *Ahimsa* was guarded by patience which "fears no failure, courts no success." He planned and now millions of freed slaves are attempting to build according to the great architect's plan. In what measure will they follow it?

The Republic is aiming at being a Democratic State. But Plato, who visioned the True Republic, spoke of its powers for good and for evil. In his Eighth Book he states that

governments don't spring up out of stones and trees but from the quality of mind and way of living of the citizens—as the scale is turned by this or by that, and all the rest is changed with it.

The death of a democracy lurks in its false concept of Freedom, says Plato. Tyranny is "an outgrowth from democracy" and it "too came to its end through *its* idea of good," which is Freedom.

What will the Indians make of their newly born republic? If the Voice of the People is to be the Voice of God, then people of a different calibre and capacity must arise. People must change from what they now are. An appreciable majority must know and apply what Gandhiji taught. But such a class cannot arise till a group of leaders has emerged, leaders who will purify and elevate themselves in the art of sacrifice through personal mortification. Plato also describes the capacity of such leaders :—

They will have to turn upward the eyes of their soul and look up to that which gives light to all, and when in this way they have seen the good itself, let them use it as their example in the right ordering of the state, the citizens, and themselves. They will give the greater part of their time to philosophy, but when their turn comes they will work as servants of the state, taking office for the good of the state and looking on this not as something to be desired but as necessary.

SHRAVAKA

RELIGION AS REVELATION AND AS DISCOVERY

[**Sramanera Sangharakshita** is an English Buddhist monk resident in India for a number of years. In this article he makes a valuable contribution to comparative religion and to the reconciliation of the different types of faiths, all echoes of the one unchanging Truth. However the foliage of the twigs may differ in form and colour, the trunk of the tree and its main branches are still those of the primeval Wisdom Religion, of which every religion in its pristine purity was an offshoot. The urge to seek for that Truth is innate in man, but it is axiomatic that "Nature unaided fails." Human beings seeking Truth outside themselves become enmeshed in one or another partial expression of Truth or even in error, and so they fall into confusion and other-dependence from which they need help to extricate themselves; and such help is forthcoming. If Truth exists, there must be Knowers of it—Perfected Sages who preserve it in its purity and cause it to be given out afresh from time to time. Members of the great Fraternity of Adepts, whom men describe as Avataras, Prophets, Saviours, Messengers, proclaim a single doctrine, calling upon men to look within for the Divine Revealer in the heart of each, discovering whom and hearkening to whose message, man learns that Religion-as-Revelation and Religion-as-Discovery are the two wings on which the consciousness of man may soar.—ED.]

The study of the Science of Comparative Religion, inaugurated in Asia by the Buddha (*Digha Nikaya, Brahmajala Sutta*) and in Europe by Roger Bacon (*Opus Majus*), is one of the most fascinating subjects to which the mind of man can possibly devote itself. The spectacle of the millennia-long struggle of humanity towards the Truth cannot fail to arouse the deepest and most poignant emotions in the breast of him who contemplates it with genuine sympathy. For the history of Religion is, in fact, the history of man; not, indeed, of the peripheral and accidental man, but of the central and essential man; not of his physical body and material environment, but of that profoundest and most pregnant part of him which we may call his mind or heart (Indian *citta*, Chinese *hsin*). It is not the history of the memorable deeds that he has done, of the great empires which he has founded, of the immense wealth that he has wrung from the bosom of nature, but of the character which he has formed, of the degree of inner illumination which he has attained, or of what, in a word, he has *become*.

The totem and fetish of the savage, to say nothing of the religious doctrines and philosophical systems of the civilized, awaken in us vague feelings of sympathy which is almost reminiscence. For we are all bound on the same pilgrimage, have passed

through the same stages of development, and therefore hold in the present moment of our consciousness the accumulated inheritance of all that man has ever thought and felt and done. We have sacrificed our children to Moloch, we have severed the sacred mistletoe with a sickle of gold, we have danced in drunken frenzy on the moonlit hills of Thrace; and we, too, perhaps, have listened enraptured to the Sermon on the Mount, or heard some Buddha, Bodhisattva or Arahant unfolding before us the mysteries of the Good Law. The *samskharas* or active impressions created by those experiences still live within us and vibrate whenever the simulacrum of the object which originally imprinted them appears.

The study of the Science of Comparative Religion is, therefore, in truth the study of the evolution of our own consciousness. Herein lies the secret of its tremendous fascination. Moreover, it enables us, when properly studied, to see the various grades and species of religious experience not as isolated or unconnected events in man's mental life, but as the intimately interrelated component parts of a great pyramid of consciousness, the apex whereof is the Consummation of Incomparable Enlightenment (*Anuttara Samyak Sambodhi*).

But the researches and investigations which a host of anthropologists, archæologists, philologists and historians have been making for more than a century have placed before the student of Comparative Religion such a bewilderingly rich variety of material in such astounding quantities that he is now in grave danger of being unable to see the wood for the trees. It has thus become imperative to divide religions into types in order to transform the chaos of mere unrelated facts into the cosmos of an exact science. We are familiar with such divisions as natural and revealed; true and false; natural, anthropological and psychological; of finite mind, infinite mind and absolute mind; theistic, atheistic, pantheistic and so on. Others more elaborate and more strictly scientific have also been suggested. But that division of religions which we are about to consider is not only perhaps more fundamental than any of these but moreover of vital importance in the dharmic or normative life.

The problem of whether Religion is essentially a revelation of truth *to* man or a discovery of truth *by* man is in fact the intellectual formulation of a spiritual difficulty which each one of us experiences in the course of his or her quest for Reality. The most obvious and natural grouping of the various religions and sects of the world is, therefore, into those for whom Religion consists in revelation, and those for whom it consists of discovery, of the Truth. This division is not simply theoretical, since each of these definitions of Religion has exercised a profoundly modifying influence upon the entire body of the beliefs and practices of the

religions which were, whether consciously or unconsciously, dominated by it. Perhaps it was with some such division in mind that Stanislaw Schayer wrote of Buddhism as "the most profound and most fundamental antithesis to Christianity."[1]

Nor is this division wholly new. Far-Eastern Buddhists have long been familiar with the classification of religions into those depending on "self-power," in Japanese *jiriki*, and those depending on "other-power," or *tariki*. And in India religious aspirants are sometimes spoken of as displaying the characteristics of the young monkey, which clings fast to the hair of its mother's belly, or of the kitten, which is simply carried about helpless in her mouth.

Religion-as-Revelation holds that the existence of Religion in the world, and therefore the possibility of the attainment of Salvation or Emancipation by man, is ultimately dependent on the Object, the Other, and that the initiative in the matter belongs wholly to It or Him. It conceives the spiritual life not as the progressive actualization of a perfection potentially present in man but as the acceptance of something which he would never have been able to acquire by his own unaided efforts. Consequently, it tends to stress the weakness and sinfulness of human nature and to emphasize the necessity of extra-terrestrial intervention in the affairs of humanity.

It is, therefore, only natural that Reality should be conceived as personal, and that the founders of the various religions and sects should be regarded as prophets or messengers (*nabi, rasul, messiah*) sent from, or as full or partial incarnations (*avataras*) of, Him. The written record of the message, teaching or life of each such founder is invariably regarded as the Word of God Himself, and to doubt, question or criticize a syllable of it is considered not only to preclude all possibility of salvation but even to ensure eternal damnation. Religion-as-Revelation, therefore, places the strongest possible emphasis on faith in God, faith in His prophet, messenger or incarnation, faith in His infallible Word, faith in His Church, faith in His priest.

Unfortunately, the beliefs of the various founders, scriptures and churches which are included in this group of religions often disagree not only among themselves but also with those which are included in the other group. Hideous fanaticism and ferocious persecution thus ensue. Since each such religion regards its own particular revelation as the supreme and incontrovertible source of Truth, the possibility of an appeal to reason and experience is automatically precluded. Obviously, God would not wittingly contradict Himself. One revelation must therefore be true, and the remainder false, that is to say, not revelations at all

[1] *The Religions of the World.* The Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Calcutta. 1938. Vol. I, p. 218.

but simply human fictions and inventions. Moreover, the house of Religion-as-Revelation is divided not only against itself but also against many other houses as well—against Science, for instance, which has succeeding in demonstrating the fallibility of many an infallible scripture. Is it, then, a matter for wonder that Religion-as-Revelation is fast losing its hold upon the hearts and minds of reflective men and women throughout the world ?

Religion-as-Discovery, on the other hand, holds that Religion is essentially a manifestation of the human spirit, that man himself is able to discover the Way to Truth by means of his own unaided human efforts, that the attainment of liberating knowledge depends upon the subject or the self, and that the initiative in the matter rests ultimately within the abysm of one's own volition. It would envisage the dharmic or normative life not as the engraftment of some exotic blossom onto the barren stock of humanity but as the flowering forth of its native perfection from the seed within. Consequently, it is inclined rather to inspire man by appealing to his innate strength and goodness than to discourage him by dwelling upon his mistakes and failures.

Instead of imagining an arbitrary divine intervention to be the most important event in history it asserts the supremacy of natural law and maintains that the aspiration towards emancipation must, like every other process, proceed in accordance with an eternal and universal order (*sanatana dharma*). It is therefore hardly surprising that Religion-as-Discovery conceives Reality as a suprapersonal principle of knowledge or state of consciousness or that it regards the religious founder simply as one who, after himself realizing that principle or state, teaches humanity the way thereto. The records of his life and teachings are only a map describing the Way, a raft to cross the stream, or a finger pointing to the moon. They demand not blind faith but clear-sighted understanding, they appeal not to some infallible authority but to reason and experience. Religion-as-Discovery is, therefore, not only tolerant of all other religious beliefs and practices, howsoever divergent from its own, but is able to join hands with earnest seekers after truth in every sphere of human activity. It sees Science not as an enemy but as a friend and a fellow-worker.

These are the two principal conceptions of Religion in what may be described as their " chemically pure " state. But if we are to proceed in accordance with the spirit of the Science of Comparative Religion we shall not leave them in a position of uncomfortable antithesis but shall try, instead, to discover the psychological basis of their divergence. This will enable us not only to understand their mutual relation but also to determine their respective positions in the hierarchy of consciousness.

Understanding is impossible without sympathy. Let us therefore project ourselves, as it were, into the mind of one who feels the necessity of revelation and try to understand his condition from within rather than from without. The two elements which play the chief rôles in such a mind are an intense aspiration towards Reality and an overwhelming sense of inability to attain thereto. A feeling of continual frustration therefore naturally ensues and in time becomes so intense that the subject is willing to adopt any available means of bringing to a speedy end the terrible tension by which he is tormented. It is, therefore, with a sense of tremendous relief that he casts the whole responsibility for his salvation upon the shoulders of the Other. He receives with joy and gratitude the gospel of salvation by simple faith and goes out in an ecstasy of adoration towards whoever proclaims that it is sufficient to trust in Him.

Upon extricating ourselves from the antinomy of such a consciousness we are naturally prompted to ask why it should have been unable to attain to Reality by means of its own unaided efforts. In order to answer this question we shall have to consider in what cultural and religious environment this antinomic consciousness most commonly arises. The matter is not difficult to determine. The three extant Semitic religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, are clearly all dominated by the conception of Religion-as-Revelation. All believe in a self-revealing God, all possess an infallible sacred book, and all believe, albeit in different ways, in some one supposed to have been sent to man from God.

Let us also consider in what cultural and religious environment the opposite type of consciousness most commonly arises. Buddhism and Taoism are perhaps the only religions which consistently adhere, in their oldest and most authoritative scriptures, to the conception of Religion-as-Discovery. Hinduism as a whole wavers uncertainly between the two conceptions. The Yogadarshana, which is affiliated to Buddhism, inclines for instance toward one, while the two Mimamsas, which are weighed down by the burden of Vedic authority, and various devotional schools which are theistic and incarnationist, incline toward the other.

Having thus determined which religions and sects conceive Religion as revelation, and which regard it as discovery, we are in a position to enquire whether there is present in the various systems belonging to each group any common factor which predisposes them to view Religion in the two ways described. Such a factor there indeed is. It is the presence in Buddhism of a graded path of *Sila, Samadhi* and *Panna*—a clear and comprehensive Way leading progressively from the lowest point of mundane to the loftiest pinnacle of supramundane consciousness—and its absence in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, that is the

principal cause of the difference between their respective conceptions of Religion. It is a startling but nevertheless completely verifiable fact that neither in the Old Testament of the Jews nor in the New Testament of the Christians, nor yet in the Muslim Quran, is there anything even remotely approaching the scheme of systematic self-culture comprised in the Middle Way or Aryan Eightfold Path of Buddhism.

Christ has truly said "The Kingdom of Heaven is within you"; but the Christian Scriptures contain only a few scattered and unconnected hints on how to realize it. The same may be said of Judaism and Islam. It is, of course, true that each of these three great faiths produced a large number of spiritually gifted men and women who not only regarded Religion as discovery but even progressed along the Path themselves and described many of its stages for the benefit of their friends and followers. Such were the Kabbalists among the Jews, the Mystics among the Christians, and the Sufis among the Muslims. But these persons were not only regarded with the gravest suspicion, and even violently persecuted, by their more orthodox co-religionists, but are regarded by modern students of Comparative Religion as being subject to strong influences of Indian origin. Thus A. C. Bouquet, an Anglican clergyman, writes that the thought of the pseudo-Dionysius [universally regarded as the fountain-head of medieval Christian mysticism] is only superficially Christian, and has a quite different religion as its real basis.... Mysticism of the non-Christian type is perfectly at home in the religious life of Indians. Hence those parallels to the Christian mystics of the Middle Ages which have been found in Hindu and Buddhist literature and to which attention has been drawn, are not in the least surprising, and do not mean that the Christian mystics in question have an affinity with the Hindus by virtue of their Christianity, but purely in consequence of their having steeped themselves in a particular apocryphal writing, which is based upon the writings of the Levantine pagan mystic, Proclus.[1]

Dean Inge, the celebrated modern representative of Christian Neoplatonism, has been branded, like Shankara in India, as "a disguised Buddhist." Sufism developed largely in consequence of the spiritualizing influence exercised by Buddhism and Vedanta on primitive Islam. Even Taoism is not wholly free from the suspicion of Buddhist influence. We moreover observe that with the growth of mysticism, whether in its Jewish, Christian or Muslim forms, there is a corresponding development of the characteristics associated with the conception of Religion as essentially a process of discovery and realization. The great mystics are consequently disinclined to stress the infallibility of any scripture, declaring instead that the light can shine forth only from within; they display a rare tolerance and breadth of vis-

[1] *Comparative Religion*, New Edition, 1945, page 33.

ion which the fanaticism and narrow-mindedness surrounding them serve to make more conspicuous; they proclaim with one voice that Religion is a Path to be followed, a Realization to be won, not a ritual to be performed or a creed to be believed.

Conversely, when certain Buddhist sects, such as that founded by Nichiren, degenerated into Religion-as-Revelation, and began to regard the Buddha as a self-revealing Deity, the *Saddharmapundarika Sutra* as His infallible revelation to mankind, and Nichiren himself as His inspired messenger—in a word, began to exhibit all the characteristics of the conception of Religion as essentially revelation—they naturally adopted an intolerant and hostile attitude towards all other sects. Needless to say, they laid more stress on faith in the Deity, the Scripture and the Prophet than on the cultivation of the threefold Path of *Sila, Samadhi* and *Panna*.

Scarcely better is the attitude of certain pseudo-Theravadins who maintain that it is impossible to tread the Path or to attain Nibbana in the present age, and that one should, therefore, simply fold his hands in resignation and await the advent of Metteyya Buddha. The careful student of Comparative Religion will be able to discover numerous examples of this highly significant correlation of the presence or absence of a progressive Path with the conceptions of Religion-as-Discovery and Religion-as-Revelation, respectively.

We are now able to see that these two principal conceptions of Religion are not merely antithetical, but that one is comprehended in the other. The Middle Way or Aryan Eightfold Path exists everywhere, for suffering exists everywhere; but it is not always perceived. Those who do not perceive it, together with those who, having perceived a little of it have trodden it to that extent, naturally feel the need of revelation and tend to think of Religion as something that satisfies that need. Religion-as-Revelation is not opposed to, or unconnected with, Religion-as-Discovery, but is simply the product of a psychological difficulty which arises when one is either unable or unwilling to tread the Path to its end. Religion-as-Revelation is embraced in Religion-as-Discovery just as a stage of the Path is included in the whole Path, and as our partial and fragmentary mundane consciousness is comprehended in the supramundane universal consciousness of Supreme Buddhahood.

SRAMANERA SANGHARAKSHITA

THE ETHICS OF PROHIBITION

[**Mr. John Barnabas** argues here a case which should need no brief, as far as the condemnation of any State's prospering on the degradation and misery of its citizens is concerned. Madame H. P. Blavatsky expressed herself strongly, in an article published in her magazine *Lucifer* the month she died, May 1891, on the iniquity of States' conniving at the moral ruin of their people for the Exchequer's sake. She wrote truly that "Nations which out of revenue-greed hesitate to abolish opium and whiskey trades, fattening on the untold misery and degradation of millions of human beings, have no right to call themselves either Christian or civilized."—ED.]

The path of the Aryan has been, through history, the path of a seeker after the higher values of life. It has not been unusual for individuals and groups not to count the cost in that pursuit. As the traveller moves on with the torch in his hand, it flickers or gleams according to the vagaries of the wind, but the torch has never been put out.

Some time ago Shri B. G. Kher, the Premier of Bombay, said, "Everywhere there is a cry that there is a tremendous fall in our morals, in our character and in our general behaviour. The atmosphere is deplorable....The existence of black-marketing and the persistence of it in spite of efforts to combat that evil shows that our business men are not keeping or coming up to the standard that we ought to have. It is in this context that I would like you to view the question of Prohibition. I maintain that there is a close relationship between character and drink."

The advocates of moderate drinking will probably question this statement and suggest that a man of character can be a moderate drinker. But that drink has the potentiality of affecting for the worse behaviour and character few can challenge.

Liquor has through the ages been the chief agent for inducing conduct that man, when sober, would not dream of. It is the chief instrument by which prostitutes carry on their profession, and for robbing men. The army is given liquor so as to enable the men to rush into a particularly dangerous fight. Liquor has been employed for molesting women and for committing thefts and murders. When a man desires to do something which his sense of decency forbids, he gets drunk and does it. According to a recent investigation, 50% of the prisoners in America are locked up for crimes caused directly or indirectly by liquor. Gandhiji said that most often liquor was the parent of both prostitution and thieving.

Prohibition, therefore, contributes to the building of a nation's morals by removing an important source of immorality. But the Individualist and the Utilitarian may suggest that enforcement of morals is not the

business of the State. And yet they cannot quarrel with the view that the State must not aid or abet immorality. It is at least its duty to create an environment in which the individual may live a decent life, by removing the obstacles thereto. In any event the State ought not to be an active agent in perpetuating the source of evil and that is exactly what it does when it runs a Department for obtaining Excise Revenue.

It is the Government that controls the manufacture, importation and sale of intoxicants and drugs. It auctions toddy shops and licenses the sale of liquor and drugs. It provides the poisonous intoxicants and drugs to the people in an organized manner. And for doing this the Bombay Government got Rs. 9 crores as Excise Revenue in 1945-46. Of this Rs. 6 crores came from toddy and country liquor, which is the drink mostly taken by the poor, the workers and the peasants. It is these masses, economically the poorest and least able to pay, who pay 16% of the Government's total Revenue and the Excise Revenue accounts for 26% of the total Revenue.

The Government of India formerly manufactured or obtained opium from across the border and sold it to the Provincial Government at Rs. 37/2 per seer, while at the Departmental Drug Store the Provincial Government sold it at Rs. 180/0 per seer! This colossal profiteering was an oppressive measure which no canon of taxation can justify. The present Government has tried to undo the mischief perpetrated by its predecessor.

It may be legitimately questioned if the State should indulge in this exploitation of the poor and trade on people's vices in the name of its need for money. Even if the end is to use that money for the good of the people and to meet the cost of amenities for them, is the means by which it is gained of no concern to the State? Gandhiji continually taught us that the means must justify the end. His giving top place to Prohibition in his constructive programme was closely related to this need for the means justifying the end.

It is also an accepted fact that there must be equity in taxation. When less than 10% of the people—and that too the poorest of them—are made to pay 16% of the State's Revenue this means blatant exploitation. And yet economists have advised against the losing of much needed revenue. But I believe that the fiscal policy of any Government must be based on ethical principles. Is economics to govern ethics or is ethics to influence economics? Prohibition is the result of a conviction that the fiscal and economic policy of a Government must have a moral basis.

The pure materialist may, however, accuse me of confusing ethics and economics. Gandhiji, when charged with mixing up politics and religion, replied that he who said religion had nothing to do with politics know neither religion nor

politics. It is because he based his political struggle on the moral laws of truth and non-violence that India was able to achieve political independence in a manner which has no parallel in history. It is because of this that today the materialistic, war-worn world looks to India for showing the way to world peace. It is as an advocate of a moral basis for human affairs and the idea that the means must justify the end that Pandit Nehru came to be looked upon as a world leader during his recent tour of the United States of America. When, therefore, the State introduces Prohibition with a view to recasting the moral basis of its fiscal policy, it is essentially following the historic Aryan path in full appreciation of the relation between ethics and economics.

But some say that, while the end of Prohibition, being human welfare, is just, the means, being force—the force of law—is wrong. Plato and Socrates both agreed that "the supreme end of human existence is virtue," and that "the just man is the man who takes his proper place in the life of his city, performs faithfully his civic functions, and subordinates his private interests to the public weal." The State is a moral and spiritual institution and is an extension of the personality of the individual. It is true that the State cannot enforce morality directly. It can only make it possible for the individual to earn his own morality. T. H. Green, a great political philosopher rightly says :—

The only acts which the State ought to enjoin or forbid are those of which the doing or not doing, from whatever motive, is necessary to the moral end of society.

The State by enforcing Prohibition is using the force of law not to "enforce morality" but only to create an environment which makes it possible for the individual who so desires to be moral. It is an error of judgment to suggest that the liquor addict is responsible to himself for his acts of omission and commission. As Dr. J. C. Kumarappa points out :—

When a drunkard takes his earnings to the toddy shop and gets intoxicated, it is easy to understand that there is violence and dishonesty in his deeds. His wife and children have a right to his earnings. He is depriving them of these and so there is dishonesty and untruth in it. He loses his rational life and so does violence to himself. A devotee of Truth and Non-violence, therefore, will work for Prohibition to realize Truth and Non-violence in the daily life of the people.

The drinker's "violence" thus makes it necessary for the State to step in to enable him to fulfil his obligations to society, to prevent him from being a hindrance in the pursuit of the supreme end of human existence—virtue.

The end of both the individual and the State is the development of human personality. Woodrow Wilson, summing up under ten heads the optional or ministrant functions of the State, includes "sumptuary laws, such as 'Prohibition' laws."

The idealist political philosopher Bosanquet has clearly held the view that the State is an ethical institution, that it is the embodiment of an ethical idea, that it is a moral organism practically identical with society. If, as James Seth asserts, "the function of the State is not to supersede the person, but to aid him in the development of his personality, to give him room and opportunity, it exists for him, not he for it; it is his sphere, the medium of his moral life," the introduction of Prohibition is a definite step in the State's fulfilling of its rightful rôle. Even if, in the process of doing its duty, the State seems to be using "force" by enforcing social legislation, it is doing what is necessary in the interest of society. For, as Reinhold Niebuhr says in his *Moral Man and Immoral Society* :—

A rational society will probably place a greater emphasis upon the ends and purposes for which coercion is used than upon the elimination of coercion and conflict. It will justify coercion if it is obviously in the service of a rationally acceptable social end, and condemn its use when it is in the service of momentary passions.... Equality or, to be a little more qualified, equal justice is the most rational ultimate objective for society. If this conclusion is correct, a social conflict which aims at greater equality has a moral justification which must be denied to efforts which aim at the perpetuation of privilege.

To continue acquiring the Excise Revenue from the weak and poor is to perpetuate the injustice of the many escaping legitimate taxation. Prohibition paves the way for a system of taxation that will spread the burden equably over the whole population, enabling the State to mete out equal justice. By so doing the State cleans its soiled hands of "tainted money," protects the citizen from falling prey to the source of all evil and creates an atmosphere in which the individual can live a sober, peaceful, moral life, fulfilling his obligations to the family, the community and the State.

JOHN BARNABAS

[It may be mentioned that there will be total prohibition in Bombay from April 1st, 1950, though with certain regrettable exceptions, as, for example, for the Defence forces as well as for foreigners. Bombay thus joins Madras as a total prohibition Province; and the United Provinces and West Bengal are introducing prohibition gradually. It is hoped that all the other Provinces and States of India will follow the good example and thus cleanse India's escutcheon from the stain of profiting by the moral degradation of her people.—ED.]

THE MYSTIC IN MAN

[**Mrs. Esme Wynne-Tyson** is the author of several novels, some independently written and others in collaboration with the late J. D. Beresford, who had prepared an introduction to her book, *The Unity of Being*, which is to be published shortly. Her *Prelude to Peace* has been highly praised by educationists.—Ed.]

The mystical sense is strong in all normal men and women, and even in some of those judged to be most abnormal; in the latter case, this sense is merely more degraded, perverted or distorted than it is in the average person. But except in the rare instances of the consciously recognised religious mystic, there is always a false interpretation put upon the nature of this sense whenever it appears in the consciousness of the individual.

The most common phase of its appearance is as love between the sexes on all levels. The urge to unity, the overwhelming desire to surrender the self to the Self and so to obtain completion, constitutes the pure, mystical sense, but when it is mistakenly expressed on the carnal or fleshly level, it is seen as sexual indulgence; and observers—even those who account themselves "scientific"—judging the cause by this effect, have come, in the case of the Freudian and similar schools of thought, to the conclusion that "sex" is the basic motive of life and the strongest passion in existence. This is the usual loose and easy diagnosis which comes from the *a posteriori* method of deduction, assessing cause from effect—in other words, judging by appearances instead of from "righteous judgment": judgment founded on spiritual knowledge derived from the unseen instead of from the seen.

No one denies that, in the phenomenal world, sex has immense power, but that power derives from the basic urge, the supreme desire of all living things, for "salvation"—or return to the Source of all Being: "That they may be one even as we are one"; and the sexual expression of this desire is merely the human and false approximation to fulfilment. And when any great spiritual force is misdirected, the result is always chaos, disillusionment and disaster on the outward plane.

This is even more particularly evident, perhaps, when the mystical urge is exploited for political instead of affectional ends. And this is the outlet which it has most noticeably taken during the past two decades. Its effects have been startlingly exposed in all forms of totalitarian government, and the world has gasped and trembled at the power wielded by nations unified by a commonly held idea. No martyr at the stake has more wholly dedicated himself to his idea of God than the young Nazi or Fascist dedicated his

life at the beginning of the last war to the unworthy God of the State; and the same applies to the 100 per cent Communist. People who do not recognise what lies at the back of these political ideologies and therefore what accounts for their strength; who do not perceive that they are—however mistakenly—forms of vital religion (in the sense of a mystical binding together), will never be able to diagnose or successfully "treat" the disorders these systems produce.

What we loosely term democracy, or the free way of life, has not this overmastering, perverted spiritual urge behind it. On the whole, its idea of liberty tends more to separatism, the freedom of the individual, a loosening rather than a binding of ties, leaving man free to seek, find and identify himself with his own highest concept of Good or God. And this policy is nearer right than the bonds of a false ideology, since only freely attained at-one-ment can be of lasting value. But how often is this democratic unity so used? On the contrary, its effects are almost invariably exhibitions of self-will, egotism and licence which inevitably and directly lead back to the house of bondage.

Meanwhile the followers of false political ideologies are accepting a discipline of mind and body, suffering hardships, making sacrifices every bit as rigorous as those suffered by the ascetics and Holy Men of the ages, so bringing themselves into subjection to an idea bigger than themselves and thereby experiencing that extension of consciousness always attendant on the act of the "part" submitting to the Whole. But when the idea is a false one, when the Whole is anything less than the Spirit of Love, Truth and Goodness, or the one true God, the end of such submission is calamity, the calamity, in this case, of the termitary or the hive: the building up of an immense Tower of Babel on material premises which are liable at any time to be disintegrated in an instant by "the breath of God," the Word of Truth, exposing their falsity and unreality.

The tragedy is that the mystical urge in man continues to go unrecognised or misinterpreted when it is not actually exploited. If it were truly recognised for what it is by those in authority, it could, if they were wise enough and willing, be directed into its rightful channels and earth would at last harbour a community of saints.

The answer to this may be that if such a state of affairs came about it would eventually mean the end of the world. This is undoubtedly true of the present phenomenal world; but surely it would be a more peaceful and satisfactory end than that at present visualised by our atom-splitting experts! Moreover, those who achieved that "end"—obviously far more distant in any case than that being prepared for us in the scientific laboratories—would be men who had already glimpsed and laid the foundations of that "new heaven and new earth wherein

dwelleth righteousness ;" that Kingdom which Plato explained as having no place or being in the space-time world but living eternally in the Spirit or consciousness of man—to be eventually objectified in some way to individual experience.

But the carnal mind has its way of deceiving "the very elect"; and the Christian churches, whose business it should surely have been to recognise and direct this all-important mystical urge in men, have consistently ignored or denied it or used it for the debased purpose of ensuring loyalty to sectarianism and the outward church organisation. On the whole, their ministers display the greatest possible lack of confidence in humanity. The disparity in the teachings handed out by the Roman Catholic Church to its humbler members and to its more intellectually advanced adherents makes this abundantly clear. To the latter class a certain regulated amount of mystical knowledge is allowed to seep through the primitive doctrines, dogmas and idolatries still employed to teach and enslave the "simpler-minded." This policy is always based on the assumption that men in general are not able to understand or to assimilate the higher truths, that they are not spiritually developed enough for mystical knowledge and experience, and that they are, in effect, in the "miserable sinner" category and so continually in need of being rescued from this state by the ministrations of Mother Church—though, after 2,000 years, the present condition of the "Christian world" suggests that she has not been very successful in her rôle of rescuer.

This belief, however, undoubtedly keeps power in the hands of an organisation whose only true reason for existence is that it should relegate the power to the "children" by showing them how individually to recognise their sonship with God. But whether this policy is adopted deliberately and consciously in order to exert temporal power or whether the Church itself lacks faith in the mystical potentialities of man—in which case it must always lack the power to bring these potentialities to fruition—is a matter for its own conscience to decide. But the truth cannot be denied that the pitifully few genuine mystics who have been produced by any Church have always embarrassed the organisation considerably during their lifetimes by their "heresies" and, in many cases, have only been canonised or received into the Church's favour many years after their deaths, when memory of their divergence from orthodox opinion has been conveniently forgotten or deliberately misinterpreted.

But the majority of church-goers have never had their mystical urge satisfied beyond the discipline of submitting their intellect to the teachings of sectarianism, and abandoning their individual search after God for obedience to the rulings of their chosen church. The result of this is always to be stultified and

crystallised into some limitation of creed and dogma instead of "to grow in wisdom and in power."

Can it be wondered at that the majority have at last revolted against these spiritual shackles which have never satisfied the soul's primal hunger, and have fallen away from the churches either into a mere wistful, personal belief or a frank agnosticism, or—as is far more often the case today—have tried to slake their thirst for mystical union at some fountain of political ideology, the High Priests of which do at least believe in the potentialities and uses of the visible man, even if only as a "cell" for some totalitarian scheme. They have some respect for their "pawns" and do not call them "miserable sinners," but rather proclaim them as "the hope of the world," which is at least a step nearer to being the Sons of God. These political pastors and masters say—which is true—that salvation can only come through the individual; that it is not outside of themselves by means of some inexplicable "grace" but within their own potentialities: that as every man "pulls his weight," contributes his uttermost to the State or Community, puts in all he has of strength, capacity and willing obedience to those in authority, he will be helping to bring in a new and better way of life,—a new heaven and a new earth based on economic security.

Not so very different, this, from the call of the soul to the mystic, the demands of God on man. And the promise of tangible, material rewards are tempting to those who have received no recompense, mental, spiritual or material, from allegiance to what the churches have taught is Christian worship. At least an outlet is provided here for those potentialities which have called so long and in vain for expression. The seeker for union can give his utmost, can forget himself in working for the community, can feel that he is living for something more worth while than just to satisfy his own selfish ends; and finally he can lose his sense of finity and inadequacy by identifying himself with the tremendous idea of an all-pervading, all-powerful State. The mystic in man can go into action, and the result will be an integration of the individual which is satisfying and power-providing even on a material level.

And so the churches, whose duty it is to maintain and point the right direction for this vital urge, diminish it because of their wilful or ignorant neglect of this duty. They cast envious eyes at the State which is taking advantage of the potentialities, capacities and loyalties which they have ignored or denied and impotently blame the machines or politics for this materialistic age, instead of repenting of their own failure, and clear-sightedly analysing its cause.

But even if they did so, would they have the sincerity and honesty to rectify their error? For, if they truly and conscientiously provided for the mystical urge in their follow-

ers, teaching those things which would enable every man at last to be his own priest and his own physician, would they not eventually have to put themselves out of office, have to sacrifice their lives as separate churches and give up their power to "forgive sin" in teaching their adherents how to forgive themselves and so grow beyond the need of forgiveness?

Yes, it would be necessary for the Church itself to become "mystic"—to be willing to surrender its material existence, power and prosperity to its spiritual teaching before it could make mystics of its followers. And that seems less likely and possible than that the individual man, wearying of materialism and its unsatisfying fruits, should eventually renounce these things and renew the eternal search for God. If he does this with all his heart and soul and without the restraining hold of any limiting church or creed, he will find a response to the love and desire for Truth within himself and, through the experience of some later-day saint or a seer of a past age whose teachings survive through the printed page, or some other aid sent him of the Father who does not reward the genuine seeker "with a stone," he will find the Word necessary to make him recognise, and apply in the right direction that mystical urge in him and in every man. In this way, by his own undeviating effort, he will learn to love good supremely and his neighbour as himself, thus obeying the supreme law for obtaining that Unity which is the Kingdom of Heaven—the only resting-place that will ever satisfy the mystic in man.

ESME WYNNE-TYSON

LAST WISH—

Could I but choose my place of death, then I
Like chrysalis, would shed my earthly shell
Beside the downs I've loved so long and well—
CUT FROM THE DOWNS THE TURF TO COVER ME;
No other mark I ask—Infinity
Is ever touching finite things and we,
With matted minds and tortured wills, can see
So little; yet, through all perplexity,
We recognize a far though felt Unseen
Through near and Seen (which ever nearer seems
On downs and hills)—O great Eternity,
With all the myriad years and souls between;
Be near in all our hopes and loves and dreams—
CUT FROM THE DOWNS THE TURF TO COVER ME!

P. M. B.

THE FOUNDATIONAL VALUE OF SOCIETY

[**Shri C. V. Srinivasa Murthy, M.A.,** of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Mysore, delivered a significant and hopeful address at Bombay at the end of December, as President of the Social Philosophy Section of the All-India Philosophical Congress. We are publishing it here, considerably condensed because of our space limitations. It has a message for the thinkers of the West as well as of the East.—ED.]

Having emerged from a devastating war of the greatest magnitude, it was believed that man would soon settle down to a life of peace and that he would reconstruct the world in all its aspects and create the values worthy of his dignity. It has become a pious hope. The governments of the world are becoming war-minded and the preparation for war is proceeding at atomic speed. The cessation of war has only brought on greater misery. The bitter and helpless cry for food, clothing and shelter has been universal. The human mind appears to be at the end of its tether and all values are thrown to the winds. Otherwise, how can we explain the conduct of a nation which prides itself on its glorious possession of spirituality, on its eternal and immutable principles of Dharma, and which yet has made itself responsible for the dastardly murder of a personality universally respected as the embodiment of Truth and *Ahimsa?* Can we say that the agony of the soul of Gandhiji in its search for the true values of life is symbolic of the agony of human life itself?

The remedy lies in a redirection of our philosophic activity, especially in its social setting. We must, however, distinguish social philosophy from philosophy, and also from a recent branch of knowledge—sociology, the study of the evolution of society as a whole. The philosopher is in search of the supreme principle of explanation, a principle which explains nature, man and spirit. We have the philosophy of nature, the philosophy of society, the philosophy of spirit. The natural, the social and the spiritual have an equal claim on our attention.

The essential character of the quest is the same, *viz.*, the unceasing search for truth and for the illumination of all aspects of our experience by the acquisition of a "synoptic vision of the whole." The differences exist only in the scope of the inquiry. We cannot have one principle for the explanation of Nature, and quite a different one for the understanding of our social and spiritual universes. We must attempt to understand the universal and all-inclusive Reality which manifests itself in Nature, man and spirit. I believe that the philosophers have so far emphasised either nature by itself or God, forgetting the centrality of man's social experience. We must

pay the much-needed attention to the foundations of human society.

The whole Universe is looked upon as the expression or manifestation of an ultimate active and energising spirit. Its life and soul are in its manifestation. Reality is process. And the process of the whole universe is a process of the creation of value.

Value is a unique experience. In it we have both the subjective and the objective as distinguishable elements. Value is an emergent springing from the interaction of subject and object in which the subject is aware of the object and aware also of the worth of the experience. Every value has the potency to create more value. The attempt of the individual to realise his ideals in and through nature, man and human life, generates new values.

Man is a composite individual of body, life and mind. As a bodily existence he is a part of nature, subserving the purposes of life; life is seeking its fulfilment in mind and mind in its turn is aspiring to a more fundamental integration in an all-inclusive spiritual experience. It is the law of the universe of reality. It is only at the rational level that the potential values of nature and of life issue to their actuality. Some value experiences are "higher," more significant than others. Value is not a static quality, but unique dynamic experience. Nature, life, mind and God are the different phases of its manifestation. There is a struggle in our nature and it is a struggle to maintain and create value.

There is a revelation of value experience in three main directions and we have traditionally agreed to call these the true, the good and the beautiful. Each of these is a dynamic concept and is never present apart from experience. It is the presence of these values that creates a feeling of individuality and a sense of adventure. An aspiration to the realisation of the famous trinity of values is a joy for ever. Its manifestation is a state which is present in every moment of our being, struggling to thrust asunder the bonds that obstruct its expression.

The values of truth, beauty and goodness are described as the intrinsic values of life. But man pursues other values as well. He is after power and wealth, fame and glory, freedom and equality. These are the instrumental values of life. Even the simplest of means derives its value from the highest of the values of life. Wealth, for example, is a *means* necessary for the cultivation of philosophy, literature and the arts and for leading a virtuous life. It is value only if it furthers these activities. The maintenance of a sound political machinery is a means for the enhancement of the values for which we live or ought to live. Even so is political freedom or economic equality. These instruments of living derive their worth from the fundamental nature of the values they help to create.

Society is in danger of becoming

decadent when man, afraid of the toil of value-creation, allows himself to be held in the grip of a system of diverse means competing for supremacy. When the instrumental values dominate, when political ambition and economic competition, lust and greed, become the ruling principles, resulting in a confusion of values, civilisation is in danger. Modern science and technology have succeeded in increasing the instruments of a good life on the largest scale possible. But they have forsaken their rightful place as instruments and have themselves become the ends of life. Atomic energy is a case in point. It can make or mar humanity. It is a great value-potential only when assigned its proper rôle of ministering to the culture of the highest values of life.

The corrective lies in a proper appreciation of the distinction between *means* and *ends*, in thought as in practice. The disinterested pursuit of truth—truth followed for its own sake—is an end in itself. A life dedicated to the realisation of goodness through self-culture and social service irrespective of the fruit thereof has the character of intrinsic value. Even so the value of beauty. The sense of the beautiful is the most intimate and, at the same time, the most significant form of disinterested human experience. All three values—truth, goodness and beauty—imply a perpetual giving away of the self, a state of complete absorption of personality in their realisation.

Even these great values, however, are not intrinsic in the highest sense of the term. The supreme value can only be one and not many. And an intellectual apprehension of the nature of Truth as a process of the ultimate spirit is dependent on a moral order. The pursuit of a good life is dependent on an understanding of the nature of goodness and the conditions of its realisation. There can be neither truth nor goodness without the experience of æsthetic delight. We speak of the truth of goodness and of the beauty of moral character.

The realisation of the final truth of things and the achievement of the best life yields bliss or *Ananda*. Thus each of these intrinsic values turns out to be instrumental (in a higher sense) or contributory to the achievement of the supreme value which may be described as peace or by the significant Indian expression *shanti*. Truth, beauty and goodness are transmuted and transfigured in the realisation of peace. Peace is the joy of creation. This dynamic concept of peace, which is a comprehensive synthesis of the different and diverse values—instrumental as well as so-called intrinsic—is, I believe, the discovery of the twentieth century so far as Western philosophy is concerned. It finds its classic expression in the philosophy of A. N. Whitehead, especially in his *Adventures of Ideas*. An exposition of the full significance of Whitehead's concept of peace merits separate treatment. But even a brief

reference will repay us.

Whitehead passes in review the four essential qualities of modern civilisation, *viz.*, truth, beauty, adventure and art. He finds these lacking in some essential qualities of civilisation.

We are in a way seeking for the notion of a harmony of harmonies which shall bind together the other four qualities so as to exclude from our notion of civilisation the restless egotism with which they have often in fact been pursued....I choose the term peace for that harmony of harmonies which calms destructive turbulence and completes civilisation. Thus a society is to be termed civilised whose members participate in the five qualities—truth, beauty, adventure, art and peace. The term peace is not a passive concept. ...It is a broadening of feeling to the emergence of some deep metaphysical insight, universalised and yet momentous in its co-ordination of values.

These statements characterising the supreme value of peace are significantly Oriental in character and cannot but inspire suffering humanity with faith and hope. Whitehead attempts a further clarification of the notion of peace by considering it in relation to tragedy. "Peace is the understanding of tragedy and at the same time its preservation." He is firmly convinced "that the suffering attains its end in a harmony of harmonies." Whitehead's philosophy appears to be an unconscious commentary on the conception of peace developed in India ages ago. But the deepest wisdom of the ancient past had to wait for centuries before it could achieve the practical conviction of the oneness of humanity. The genius of Whitehead has facilitated the possibility of a new synthesis between the East and the West on a level of deep metaphysical insight.

We have Professor M. Hiriyanna to thank for revealing to us the true character of Indian philosophy. Indian philosophy is not, as is usually supposed, a triangular contest of *advaita*, *dvaita* and *visishtadvaita* based on numerous texts and more numerous translations and commentaries. In the fog of controversy the true import of the thought of India is generally forgotten. Philosophy in India is not merely a child of wonder. It does not concern itself merely with the satisfaction of the speculative impulse. It is born of the necessity of life and is concerned with the determination of the true ideals or *purushārthas* of life—*dharma* (duty), *artha* (wealth), *kama* (desire) and *moksha* (liberation). *Artha* and *kama* are regarded as subsidiary to *dharma* and *moksha*. Even *dharma* is regarded as a means to *moksha*. Hence "we define Indian philosophy as a criticism of values."

All the other values are a means to experience of the peace of spirit. It is the apprehension of the significance of this basic value and its realisation through a continuous and disciplined life of *dharma* leading to *æsthetic* ecstasy that constitute the foundational value of human life. Such a leading idea pregnant with

the wisdom of antiquity would have almost become antiquarian but for the intense suffering of humanity today. Perhaps the world is waiting for light from the East. Here is a rich field for the leading scholars of Indian philosophic wisdom. The thinkers, the poets and the sages of India have already shown the way by their thought and by their life.

We may picture in a concrete form the emergence of the Indian conception of value in the three dominant personalities—Radhakrishnan, Tagore and Gandhi—the seeker of truth, the devotee of beauty and the greatest *karma-yogin* of modern times. While Radhakrishnan has sought to remove the ills of the world by reason and reflection and Tagore burst into song and the music of the eternal, Gandhi, inspired by the same world forces, chose the much harder life of strenuous action in the midst of strife and suffering. His was neither a Sermon on the Mount, nor a secret teaching in far-off forest dwellings. The Sermon of Truth and *Ahimsa*, of universal love and benevolence, revealed itself in his life amidst harsh and crude humanity. One of his great contributions to the cause of peace in every department of human activity is his conception of *Satyagraha* or soul-force—a concrete method of destroying evil in every form, by the acquisition through disinterested service of an inexhaustible and dynamic spiritual energy, from which under right conditions emerge truth, beauty and goodness. With an unshakable faith in the power of Truth as the process of activity, to be expressed in the form of "a continuous and continuing service of all life," he gave such a powerful expression to the spirit of *Satyagraha* that it shook a mighty Empire, thereby bringing modern civilisation to a consciousness of its own inherent weakness. Gandhiji is not an individual but a phenomenon. Gandhiji, the embodiment of serenity, peace and calm, lived to fulfil a mission in life and the values for which he lived and died have been assimilated into the ocean of life, thereby making possible the emergence of "one world," the world of humanity based on peace and love.

Radhakrishnan, Tagore and Gandhiji have voiced in no uncertain terms that peace is the foundational value of human society. It is encouraging that this spirit of peace in the East has found its echo in the writings of A. N. Whitehead, an outstanding thinker of the West. If my thesis is sound, the birth and growth of a new social philosophy is not far off.

C. V. SRINIVASA MURTHY

THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE TEACHINGS OF JESUS

AN INTERVIEW WITH SHRI J. C. KUMARAPPA

[**Shri J. C. Kumarappa**, a member of an old and respected South Indian Christian family, stands out among Gandhiji's followers as one who has wholeheartedly adopted his constructive programme, has espoused the cause of the disinherited millions and is devoting his considerable gifts as an economist and financier to popularizing, in his numerous books and articles, the non-competitive village economy with all that it implies, as against the large-scale industrialization and militarization to which so many who in his lifetime followed Gandhiji now find themselves committed. Taking advantage of his presence in Bombay early in December, to preside over the Second Conference of Forest Labourers' Co-operative Societies, a member of our staff interviewed him on this important subject. His views will be of interest to many of our readers.—ED.]

I had seen Shri Kumarappa the day before, presiding with dignity, in snow-white Khaddar and Gandhi cap, over a motley audience of Provincial Ministers, official and non-official co-operators and turbanned, simple, primitive folk, the forest labourers, *Adivasis*. Some of these promptly went to sleep when Shri Kumarappa's speech in English began. Remembering the hour-long speech in Marathi—to me as incomprehensible as English was to them—through which I had just sat, I envied them the facility with which they dozed off—one behind me frankly snoring his boredom in the universal language of a tired man. The rest of the audience were very wide awake. The President was saying some disquieting and unpopular things: disapproving the bringing of these "children of Nature" to the "jungle" of Bombay; objecting to the effort to supplant their largely barter economy with a money economy at the risk of their demoralization; deploring the effort to make a showing of the service rendered to the *Adivasis* in Rupees, Annas, Pies. "If we are not ourselves co-operators," he had demanded, "how can we carry the message of co-operation to others? Co-operation means weaving our lives together in a pattern or it is merely welfare work in a competitive economy. Let us turn the searchlight on ourselves!"

What strikes one first in Shri Kumarappa is his completely frank expression, an unconscious challenge to sincerity in others. He is trying to live up to Gandhiji's teachings and to apply the teachings of Jesus as literally as he can—even Jesus' injunction, in sending out his disciples, to find the house of a worthy man and stay there until one left the place. Thus he always stays in Bombay with the same friend, he

explained to me, not moving about from house to house, not even accepting invitations to dine elsewhere, since company dinners involve waste of food. It was to the apartment of that trusted friend (they had both been arrested there twice in the Freedom struggle) that he welcomed me at the hour he had proposed for the requested interview—7 : 30 a.m. Decidedly Shri Kumarappa does not believe in pampering himself or others !

He had, he told me at the outset, developed the general theme on which I had come to interview him in his *Practice and Precepts of Jesus* and, more specifically, in his *Economy of Permanence*, both written in the same jail. He would put the proposition in a nutshell. " The Sermon on the Mount appears to hold forth an ideal that we very much need today. It is at the basis of the society that should be founded on Non-violence and Truth. "

Jesus, he said, had taught primarily for individuals, but we should see the economic application of his teachings in Gandhiji's programme. Gandhiji's unique contribution had been to bring the Sermon on the Mount into the everyday life of society, and not merely of the individual.

I mentioned the rôle which the *Bhagavad-Gita* had also played in Gandhiji's thought. The *Gita* and the Sermon on the Mount, he said, were on parallel lines but all great Teachers had applied their doctrines to the background of the society of their day. Gandhiji, living in the age of the atom bomb, had concentrated a great deal more on non-violence than Jesus apparently had done.

" How is Jesus' teaching ' Love thy neighbour as thyself ' to be applied in the sphere of economics ? " I asked him.

" Many see in this teaching the Oriental doctrine of the immanence of God, " he said. " We are all God. There is something Divine in all of us. To love our neighbour as ourselves is a natural expression of the recognition of the Divinity in every man. You can't say the God in you and the God in me are different. If we do not separate the Divine and the physical within ourselves, then we feel no separation from others. " This injunction of Jesus, he said, could also be interpreted that we should be as meticulously careful about the needs of all our fellow-men as we were about our own. That was sublimating the selfishness of man on a universal level. A man's needs, he said, were those common to all human beings—food, clothing, shelter. What one possessed over and above these and more than other men, was stealing. Gandhiji had said possession and stealing went together.

The teaching in the Sermon on the Mount that if a man would sue us and take away our coat, we should let him have our cloke also, Shri Kumarappa interpreted as meaning that whatever surplus we had we should give to our fellow-man, and,

if he needed it, give even what we could ill spare. "Empty yourself to serve others."

"But could that not be pushed to the extreme of starving ourselves to feed others? Suppose that one were doing more important work than they could do?"

"Who can judge which work is more important? The difference between men is infinitesimal when compared to God," he said. Loving your neighbour as yourself, he went on, did not mean that you did not have to take care of your own body. "It would be wrong to starve oneself to death, but we must not gormandize at the cost of others. Gandhiji regarded the body as an entity separate from our spiritual self, and considered any neglect of our bodily health a sin. I look upon my body as an instrument that has been entrusted to me, and I have to take care of it."

Jesus had spoken, I reminded him, of how hard it was for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God. And yet, if the good Samaritan had not been a man of means he could not have helped the man in the parable as he did.

"You must make a distinction between the rich man who was selfishly piling up a large surplus and feeling secure in the expectation of enjoying for many years, whose soul God said in the parable would be required of him that night, and the man who holds his riches in trusteeship for his fellow-men. He is not a rich man in the sense condemned by Jesus. In the cause for which you stand you will be seeking voluntary poverty."

"But if one is to 'take no thought for the morrow' as Jesus said," I remarked, "even insurance would be out of place."

He agreed at once. "Taking out insurance means that you are securing yourself and are looking upon yourself as something apart from the rest. If they are insecure you must share that insecurity or else raise the level so that all will be secure. If that is not possible, then seeking special privileges is wrong."

"Even," I asked, "if one's motive is not to be a burden in old age?"

"If I have lived in the right way, why should I worry about my old age?" he asked. "I will wear out and if I have served people in my younger days I can trust those people to look after me. I am unmarried, but I have many 'sons' and 'daughters' who will look after me." If one was apprehensive about old age, one was condemning oneself as not having lived for others; it was lack of faith. Even if one was quietly serving without seeking any credit for it, a light could not be hidden.

"Would you say it was distrust in the law that 'in what measure we mete it will be measured to us again' and do you see any difference between that teaching of Jesus and the Law of Karma, rightly understood?"

It might be interpreted that way, he agreed, but the motive for doing the right thing should not be a selfish

one. Doing good that good might come to us was in the class with "Honesty is the best Policy," on a lower level altogether.

Questioned as to the economic implications of the parable about the workers in the vineyard who came about the eleventh hour getting the same wage as those who had worked a full day, Shri Kumarappa declared "A man who works for a wage reduces his Divinity. If a man demands extra pay for over-time work he is demeaning himself. The money paid him is for his upkeep. All men are equal in bodily needs. One man works for the wages' sake and another for the work's sake. If you look upon work as service to God, there is no question of remuneration."

"What," I asked, "about Jesus' saying, "The poor ye have always with you? Did he mean there was no hope of doing away with poverty?"

Shri Kumarappa chuckled. "Do you mean," he asked, "'Was Jesus displaying a defeatist mentality?'" Jesus had made that remark, he continued, in replying to the objection raised by Judas to Mary's anointing his feet with expensive ointment the cost of which could have been given to the poor. "The poor ye have always with you; but me ye have not always." Jesus had set devotion or adoration of that which is high and noble, devotion to God or adoration of a principle, on a higher level than charity. Shri Kumarappa conceded that charity could be performed as an act of devotion to the Divine in all.

"What," I asked, "would be the economic implications of Jesus' saying, 'They that take the sword shall perish with the sword'?"

"Competition," he said "always leads to struggle. For example, the devaluation of sterling is taking up the sword against American trade," he declared. "Taking it on the spiritual level, it is based on avarice and greed for what the other man has got, and anything based on avarice and greed will ultimately lead to violence." Business men in America did not share the political interest of their country in strengthening England and ill-will was coming from them. "England," he predicted, "will be the drum between the two beaters."

How did he feel that Socialism and Communism squared with the teachings of Jesus, I asked him.

Both Communists and Socialists, he said, were thinking in terms of material welfare. "Communism will say that life consists in the abundance of things we possess." Jesus and Gandhiji had thought in terms of the spiritual development of man. "We believe that large-scale industries should be socialized, but Gandhiji's whole society is based on 'What is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?'"

"Do you think there is any possibility of Jesus' teachings being applied generally in the present set-

up of society?" I asked him, as the time for his next appointment drew near. "Can it be done other than by individuals here and there?"

"We are constantly told not to worry about the results of our actions," Shri Kumarappa said. "That is the teaching of Jesus as well as of the *Gita*. Our work is a very long-term service, much longer than our individual life of three-score years and ten. Therefore, it may not be possible for us to see the fruits of our labour. If we worry about it we are likely to be frustrated. We are workers in a vineyard; the master of the vineyard is God, who lives forever. Our work is to sow the seed and water the soil and leave the rest in His hands."

CULTURES AND CULTURE

In declaring that "international understanding depends on a knowledge of the relations of cultures," the Committee on the Comparative Study of Cultures which met at Paris in mid-November, under the ægis of Unesco and the Chairmanship of Dean N. K. Sidhanta of Lucknow University, echoed the conviction which inspires the efforts of the Indian Institute of Culture to acquaint its audiences at Basavangudi, Bangalore, with the cultures of other peoples, as well as with the underlying basis of their own.

Traditional ways of life, the Committee pointed out, were changing abruptly for many peoples under the impact of technological advance and steps were necessary to insure cultural stability. What was needed was not replacing the old values with an alien set but providing means to develop, under the new conditions, values comparable with the previous ones. Knowledge of ancestral achievements must be encouraged, as also efforts to spread respect for them; but knowledge of other cultures is necessary too. In our closely knit modern world, in which the actions of individual nations inevitably affect the ways of life, customs and ideals of other peoples, the slowly emerging "world community of shared ideals and aspirations" becomes of basic importance.

If the nations achieve mutual understanding, confidence may replace fear and tensions, and within the framework of understood values and recognised motives of action, economic co-operation and political agreement may proceed to successful and effective consummations.

The suspicion of propaganda might attach to national efforts, however disinterested, the Committee suggested, but an international agency like Unesco could serve world unity by bringing out the common values and common meanings underlying the diversities of expression. The same applies, of course in a much smaller way, to disinterested efforts of private institutions here and there subserving in their modest way the same inspiring end of "a new world community of understanding and mutual respect."

PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF WORDS AND THEIR MEANINGS

[We publish here, necessarily somewhat condensed to meet our space limitations, the lecture which was given on May 24th, 1949, at the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, by **Dr. M. V. Govindaswami,** the Superintendent of the Government Mental Hospital, Bangalore. Dr. Govindaswami writes on a highly important subject, though it is obviously impossible to develop in a single lecture the full implications of speech, resting as this general and very much misused power does upon the potency of sound, at which the ancient Indian scriptures hint, as in the statement quoted by the lecturer: "Speech itself is Brahman."—ED.]

The function of all words, as you are aware, is, first, to convey meaning, and to communicate this meaning to others; and, secondly, to express one's thoughts. All words are symbols. A symbol is something which has a meaning sometimes apart from itself, for example, the flag of a nation.

There is another very interesting thing. Man is accustomed to deceive others, and is sometimes capable of deceiving himself, and the instrument he uses to accomplish this is words. Words are responsible for expressing one's thoughts, but also for hiding one's thoughts.

Words have two other very interesting functions. They suggest, and they are also capable of hiding, meanings, and finally a situation arises when words cannot express anything at all. I am trying to place before you some instances of these various functions of words. The study of human nature and of man is the subject-matter of psychology, and the psychological implication of words and their meanings perhaps may become apparent as we proceed.

The great importance of words and their uses is aptly illustrated in a slightly different sense by the following story in the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad.* It is said that Yagnavalkya, when he visited Janaka, fell into conversation with him. Janaka wanted to know from him what exactly Yagnavalkya had approached him for, whether he wanted any particular gifts for himself or whether he came for any other purpose. Yagnavalkya seems to have said, "Before I go away, maybe I shall accept some gifts, but before I go I should like to know what an enlightened sage is like." During the conversation, it came out that another great sage had visited Janaka previously, and had given him the message that "Speech itself is Brahman." This seems to have so much impressed Yagnavalkya that he praised the profound preceptor, saying that he must have been a really great man, somebody

who had been very well trained by his mother first, his father subsequently, and, later on, by his preceptor and Guru. He goes on to say that words form one of the four pillars on which the whole universe has been based.

It is unnecessary for anyone to emphasize the importance of words. So far as thought, truth and human communications are concerned, these depend almost entirely on words and their meanings. Sanskrit is still the basis for all philological speculations about words, language and grammar; it is a mine of knowledge which has still to be explored; only the surface has been explored and understood by scholars here, and also by Americans and a few Englishmen.

The relationship between such words as "Om" and "Aham," for example, is very intimate. The same type of intimate relationship prevails, we are told, between the word and its meaning as between Siva and Shakti. That is, there can be no Shakti without Siva and there can be no Siva without Shakti. Their relationship is illustrated by that which prevails between the moon and its rays. This is symbolically expressed by the left side representing Shakti and the right side representing Siva. There have been a few who have tried unnecessarily to read literal meanings into these figures. They are meant only to be depicted symbolically. Anatomically the left side of the brain controls the right side of the body; the right side of the brain controls the left side of the body. It seems significant that not only the right side of the body but also the various centres responsible for speech are governed by the left side of the brain, depicting the female complement of the male portion!

It is a little difficult for people to visualise how the Pranava or Om can be made to depict everything that it is expected to. Its importance in the Sanskrit scriptures is so great that it is quoted for everything that is good, everything that is sacred, but people forget that it has been meant as a symbol by those who have complete scriptural and other knowledge. Unless you happen to be well versed in what it signifies, it is very difficult for it to mean anything at all. The three sounds signify all that a man has to know about religion and philosophy, Atman, and Universal Consciousness.

So far as the word *Aham* is concerned, the first sound forms the first letter of the alphabet and its next the last, so everything that can be spoken of, whatever word you can use to indicate any existing object or thing is naturally made up only of these two letters, and for purposes of definition and completeness the AHAM is used. If you can visualize it in that way the possibilities of this word become a very interesting speculation and it has a psychological as well as a philosophical interpretation.

Let us take a few other words whose meanings are suggestive. I

told you that words are capable of expressing the meaning that one wants, but in spite of that they succeed by failure, and it is the failure that succeeds. Our ancient sages have said that the great test of all literature, of all poetry, of everything great in any literature, is the ability to convey much more than the actual words themselves. A very great classical Sanskrit scholar centuries ago wrote a philosophical treatise on these very words: What is meant by the failure of success? You can get illustrations of it everywhere. In one of the standard histories of English literature, writen by two French authors, they have come together on the view that, apart from the question of art and beauty, for a great literature to live what is essential is once again words. They say that Wordsworth and his colleagues and admirers concentrated on the soul as the centre for their art, whereas previous poets had concentrated only on man. This is a very essential point, and the student of Wordsworth can quote several instances of this very interesting point which can only be translated as "failure by success." In his "Ode on the Intimations of Immortality" we can recollect many instances and passages. The glory that has passed away from the earth, and the child and its intimations, all these echo and re-echo so that it is even said that what Wordsworth started in ambition finally terminated in simplicity.

In Kalidasa's *Kumarasambhava*, after Parvati's fiancé, Siva, has agreed to marry her, he naturally goes to Parvati's father to obtain his consent. When Parvati is asked her wishes, all that she does is, like a child playing "Love me, love me not," to go on picking off one petal after another from the flower in her hand. Imagine the situation! Her austere penance, her great capabilities and potentialities, a great, powerful person, who finally, by her purity and penances, has won the consent of the Lord himself. At the last moment the poet, playfully and exceedingly suggestively, depicts the scene in this fashion.

You can go on amplifying instances, in both classical Indian and English literature—the universality of Shakespeare, for example. You can quote many instances. Hamlet's answer when Polonius asks him what he is reading is, "Words, words, words." Nothing can be more appropriate as suggestive of the tremendous amount of conflict and confusion in the mind of Hamlet himself as a result of the various happenings. There has been no correlated meaning or sense—"Words, words, words,"—and that could happen to a very interesting type like Hamlet himself. You could quote any number of instances from practically every literature, and also from various scientific and philosophical treatises, which offer similar examples.

Happily, our great sages had a very brilliant gift of expressing tremendous things in simple words and

sentences. One of them, asked why there has been so much difference of opinion, merely said: "Take a huge ocean, huge waves springing up mountain high. What happens to them? A little later all settle down." Although many people go on wrangling, finally what happens? They settle down of themselves. Again, asked "What is responsible for a man's giving freely for the members of his own family, but finding it difficult and calling it a burden when it has to be done for others?," he seems to have said: "Suppose a person is carrying a lot of food, he feels every moment that it is getting heavier and heavier. He eats the whole thing and drinks plenty of water. What about the weight? *His* weight is naturally much more than what he was carrying before, but he does not feel it at all. He walks about as though there were no weight at all, because it has become part of himself; in fact he feels it to be lighter." I have been trying to give you the implications of a few words, which indicate the failure of success.

Then, I could give examples also of how words get distorted in their meaning. Naturally, where mental patients and others are concerned, the first thing you notice about them is peculiarities in their speech. They use the same language as yourself, but with different connotations and in a different context. A man may come to you and tell you he is God, or Ishwara, or call himself anything in the world, or think he is capable of flying. He makes no attempt to learn to fly, but goes on swinging his arms and saying he is flying, although all the time he is on the ground. He is using the same words, but the meanings are entirely different. An interesting field for investigation in connection with mental disorders is what the processes are by means of which the word comes to convey the changed meaning to a man. Practically every person concerned anticipates a very great future for psychological medicine. In modern India very little has been done with it, though, so far as the theory of knowledge is concerned, almost the last word has been said by our ancient sages.

I want to mention, too, the limitations of words. It is impossible, for example, for anybody to convey to others the difference in such a simple thing as the sweet taste a person experiences when eating jaggery or honey. How is it possible to convey the exact difference? It is obviously impossible, and when you go beyond the objective scene and talk about Consciousness, or Art, or the Universal, how words begin to fail! You can only speak in terms of illustrations. Language is merely the crystallised form of a people's culture and knowledge.

M. V. GOVINDASWAMI

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

PREJUDICE AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS *

Co-operation, Tolerance, and Prejudice is a technical book, intended for those versed in the psycho-analytical system of thought, and the intelligent lay reader must be warned at the outset that he would often find it very heavy going. What, for example, would he make of this ?

> It is justifiable to assume that there may prevail a real over-production of polar tension between ideas and affective currents respectively ; and if the position is beyond the capacity of the psyche to be dealt with intramentally, then something has to take place to enable an abreaction. "

The book is essentially an analysis, according to psycho-analytical concepts, of the causes of that variety of prejudice which is directed at groups of people, and the author's suggested remedy. It must be remembered, however, that another type of prejudice is even more wide-spread ; that which makes an individual refuse to open his mind to new ideas, or even to new facts, lest its hard-won integration be disturbed, and he be faced with the task of reorientating his ideas, and perhaps losing some of the status he had acquired through the beliefs and ideas threatened by the new material.

The reviewer considers that Dr. Lowy might have been well advised to concentrate on the latter type first, since it is that wide-spread prejudice which will defeat any attempt to get rid of the variety which so greatly interests him.

But to return to the book : to summarise the author's arguments would take too long, but the conclusion he eventually reaches is :—

> Prejudice formation in the broader sense is an attempt to deal with anxiety referring to the subject's moral insufficiencies.

In other words, he considers that a prejudiced person is drawing a red herring across his trail.

Can one accept this conclusion ? There can be no doubt that people who are violently prejudiced are also morally weak, for true morals are dependent on the valid use of reason, and prejudiced individuals do not reason correctly in connection with the object of prejudice. But does prejudice *arise* from the conflict in a person's mind between conscience and antisocial tendencies ? Can one not find a simpler and more elementary causation ? Could it not be a consequence of frustration ?

Mass prejudice thrives in times when the ordinary man finds it hard to make a good living. If these conditions obtain, and at the same time there exists in the community a minority which appears to be doing well economically ; and if, in addition, that minority happens to be alien, either in origin, or in religious belief, the optimum conditions are present for the outbreak of violent mass prejudice.

In such circumstances, all that is required to ignite the mixture is an orator who will first point out to the masses desirable goals such as full

* *Co-operation, Tolerance, and Prejudice : A Contribution to Social and Medical Psychology.* By SAMUEL LOWY, M.D. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., London. 318 pp., 1948. 21s.)

employment, a living wage, good houses and a bit of land for all; and then, having aroused and fanned the conscious desire for these good things, to indicate that the only thing which stands in the way and prevents the attainment of these, is this alien minority. Frustration means anger, and the anger of the unthinking masses is directed towards the group who, they are told, stand in the way of their obtaining all the material advantages they desire. Where a community already enjoys certain advantages, prejudice against a minority alien group can be aroused by utilising the fear that this group has designs on the piece of cake which the majority possesses.

An individual's hatred for a group thus acquired is not easily quenched. This hatred he justifies by rationalisation, which accounts for all the lies and false accusations directed against the objects of prejudice. It seems to the reviewer, therefore, that the place of morals in the genesis of mass prejudice is a secondary one, pertaining to a secondary process of rationalisation, whereas the primary factor in the development of mass prejudice is either frustration in attaining more material goals, or fear of losing material possessions or advantages.

But, whatever one's views about its genesis, there can be no doubt about the undesirability of mass prejudice, and thinking people would be indeed grateful to anyone who could point out practical measures which could be taken to eliminate this unpleasant phenomenon. The author's solution to the problem I shall give in his own words:—

> The enactment of the hypothesis that all individuals are equally significant for society.

This is later amplified by:—

> Let us create for the affairs of society a working hypothesis that unreasonable selfishness of the individual and also unnecessary and officious interference with human happiness is something that is "not done," something of a low category, comparable to burglary or wanton adultery.

There is nothing in these statements which is not implicit in the teachings of many great thinkers of the past, including, among others, Akhenaton (14th century B. C.), Confucius (6th century B. C.), and Jesus, but Dr. Lowy claims that his hypothesis is different from a religious or an ethical ideal because it is a *working hypothesis* which would be of no value at all unless manifested in spheres of concrete life. I have no doubt that the great teachers of history intended that their teachings of human brotherhood should be working hypotheses too, but the results have not been too good up till now.

To the reviewer it appears that the great stumbling-block to social progress lies in the more wide-spread type of prejudice referred to at the beginning of this review. It is difficult to see how such a strong view against prejudice as that envisaged by Dr. Lowy is going to be implanted in adult minds —it would mean such an alteration in their basic way of thinking; such an upheaval in so many directions, the loss of privileges which have come to be a source of pleasure, such as the petty exercise of power. No, I think there would be too much prejudice against the genuine acceptance of such a principle as a *real* working guide for life, although nearly every adult will at once accept it as a worthy ideal.

How then is society to progress? One would, very humbly, put forward

the following suggestions. Let us first seek the weak spot in the armour of prejudice, and there is a weak spot. It lies in the fact that individuals have no objection whatsoever to *other* people being improved according to worthy principles; though the fact that the other people do not want to be improved for the benefit of society, at the expense of habits of life which give them satisfaction, rules out the improvement of adults by these means. But what of the children? Most parents have no objection to their children being brought up and trained to behave according to worthy ideals, and it would be perfectly *possible* to train children to accept such a working hypothesis as Dr. Lowy's. Perhaps the best way, therefore, for thinking people to work towards a better society would be to concentrate on the education of children from the point of view of character training. Nobody objects to their being trained, although violent prejudices may be aroused when methods of training are discussed. Efforts to change the adult population's attitude to life will, I fear, bear as little fruit in the future as in the past.

This review has largely dealt with the main conclusions reached by the author in his book, which is manifestly the fruit of much thought, together with great psycho-analytical experience and, although one may not agree with his conclusions, there is a great deal of most valuable material in this book which greatly stimulates thought. Any book which can do that justifies itself, even if it should not succeed in its main object. I can, therefore, recommend this book as one most certainly to be read by all who have sufficient knowledge of psycho-analytical terms to understand what the author has written.

J. FORD THOMSON

AN INDIAN ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW *

This is an able work. Considering that its author is not an American, it is a remarkable one—a veritable *tour de force*, in the best sense. I seriously doubt if any foreigner has ever before this written a book in the field of American Constitutional Law that was half as good as this one is.

The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution reads: "The Congress shall have power...to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several States [that is, of the American Union], and with the Indian Tribes." As the late Justice Rutledge once commented:—

> The simplicity of wording covers a large intricacy of action...Congress is given the power to regulate commerce. But what is regulation? Is it prohibition? Is it taxation? And what is commerce? Does it include transportation? If so, only for hire or non-commercial movements also? How about transactions, sales, purchases, correspondence, communications, the making of contracts, conducting a general course of trade, the flight of migratory birds? Does commerce encompass manufacturing, mining, farming, and labour relations involved in those pursuits as well as in transportation and other activities?...Again, what is interstate? Does such commerce include local activities not touching or crossing state lines, which

* *The Commerce Clause in the Constitution of the United States.* By M. RAMASWAMY, B.A., B.L. (Longmans, Green and Co., London, Bombay, etc. xxiv + 648 pp. 1948. Rs. 25/-)

however "affect" or influence the course of the commerce that does, of whatever nature that may be ?

And what is the nature of Congress' power ? Is it exclusive or only paramount ? This question becomes important when a state has taken some action conceived to be possibly within the scope of the authority given Congress. For then the exclusive or possibly concurrent nature of the power, as relating to Congress alone or both to Congress and the states, comes in question. And this is further refined by the questions whether Congress in fact has acted and, if so, consistently or inconsistently with what the state has done ; or, on the contrary, if it has taken no action affirmatively, whether this makes a difference. Still further, can Congress authorize the states to do what otherwise is or may be forbidden ?

All this is complicated further by the query, who is to decide these various questions, Congress alone or judges, and in either event finally or subject to possible revision by the other branch ?

Justice Rutledge's last question is, in effect, answered by this book. Congress *and* Court have collaborated, the former by legislation, the latter by judicial decision. In the first half of his volume Mr. Ramaswamy, under the caption "Down the Years," treats of both types of material, statutes and decisions. The result is a most satisfying account of the expansion of national legislative power in the United States in response to the nationalization of communication, business and social conditions. In fact, I know of no place where an American student could find a better written, better arranged, or more informative treatment of this aspect of the subject.

But this is only half of the subject treated by Mr. Ramaswamy. Thus, in the first place, the Commerce Clause was put in the Constitution of 1789 not merely in order to enable Congress to regulate "commerce among the States," but in order also to deprive the States of that same power. Hence the clause became a restriction on State legislative power which the Supreme Court was expected to enforce, and did from the first. In fact, of the 800 cases which the Court decided under the Commerce Clause during the first century of the Constitution, more than 9 out of every 10 stemmed from State legislation the validity of which was challenged on the ground that it trespassed both on the Congress's power and on freedom of trade among the States.

In the second place, however, it was conceded that the States retained under the Constitution very large powers of domestic legislation, particularly in the fields of taxation and regulation ("Police Power"). So once Congress really began to exercise its legislative power under the clause, from 1887 on, and clashes began occurring between its acts and those of the States, the question inevitably arose as to which authority was entitled to prevail. The Constitution was somewhat ambiguous on the point. The Tenth Amendment said that the powers not delegated by the Constitution to the United States were "reserved to the States." On the other hand, the Supremacy Clause said that it was the duty of judges to prefer acts of Congress "made in pursuance" of the Constitution to any conflicting State laws and even State constitutional provisions. At times the Court leaned toward the Tenth Amendment ; at other times, it enforced the Supremacy Clause literally. Today the latter procedure has the better of the argument by far.

This second half of Mr. Ramaswamy's work is rather less satisfactory to an

American reader than the first. Nevertheless, his comprehension of the problems of constitutional interpretation involved is generally beyond serious criticism, and his skill and lucidity in presenting them are admirable.

I surmise that when Mr. Ramaswamy first undertook this work it was in the thought that American success in harmonizing, largely through the Supreme Court at Washington, national and local interests in the vast field of activities and interests which the word "commerce" has come to connote in the United States, might well furnish his own great nation valuable guidance. Perhaps it still may, although recent news despatches appear to indicate that the trend in India toward centralization is so strong that lessons based on American federal experience have already become irrelevant to her problems.

EDWARD S. CORWIN

No Ankletbells for Her: Stories. By MANJERI S. ISVARAN. (Mitra, Madras. 155 pp. 1949. Rs. 3/-); *Divine Dwellers in the Desert.* By GURDIAL MALLIK. (Nalanda Publications, Bombay 1. 1949. 80 pp. Rs. 3/12); *The Adventure of the Apocalypse.* By K. D. SETHNA. (Sri Aurobindo Circle, Bombay. 123 pp. 1949. Rs. 5/8)

Three books of wholly different type, but each a credit to its author and to India. Shri Isvaran is a serious craftsman and readers of his earlier volumes of short stories will note in this a growing maturity of treatment. But it was the child in the artist that dictated his sequel giving a happy ending to the poignant Tamil tale of Shri T. J. Ranganathan, "The Serpent Gem," which Shri Isvaran has here translated. Mr. John Hampson contributes as Introduction an illuminating treatise on the short story in general as well as an appreciation of Shri Isvaran's art.

Shri Gurdial Mallik's Extension Lectures at the Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan, on the Mystics of Sindh, published under the title "The Divine Dwellers in the Desert" hold much of inspiration for the seeker. There is depth even in such a delightfully whimsical Sufi quotation as

> "He is my own little self, my Lord, he knows no shame; but I am ashamed to come to thy door in his company."

Sophia Wadia pays a deserved tribute to the attractive volume in her Foreword.

The "Personal Preface" which the poet K. D. Sethna contributes to *The Adventure of the Apocalypse* is as interesting as the phenomenon of these eighty-nine poems, some of them of rare and haunting beauty, which poured out in the three-month period of mystic exaltation while the poet was invalided from heart strain. Shri Sethna here reaches a depth of which *The Secret Splendour* held the promise.

E. M. H.

Deviation into Sense: The Nature of Explanation. By O. S. WAUCHOPE. (Faber and Faber, Ltd., London. 163 pp. 1948. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

Mr. Wauchope, in his one allusion to Nietzsche, endorses his opinion that "numerals...are based on the error that more than one identical thing exists." Is there such an "error?" Numbering implies grouping, ignoring irrelevant differences.

Mr. Wauchope would agree with Nietzsche that "convictions are prisons." All formulation and classification derive from the need to avoid what threatens life. Life escapes all categories, and thought, though an indispensable tool of life in its higher grades, endangers it by weakening the spontaneity that is its essence.

For Mr. Wauchope reality is not spun out of our minds. But he writes: "The qualitative is the subjective. It is of the self, and the self is one." Have then, flowers or pebbles only the qualities which my mind, or minds like mine give them? Or *are* they different? Surely it is better to say that the quality of a thing is integral to it, but that we apprehend it according to our mode of consciousness. Colour is our reaction to the light proceeding from an object. But we see blue or red because the make-up of a thing causes a particular set of light-waves to reach us.

"The pattern of consciousness is the pattern of reality." Whose consciousness? Ours? Or that of a universal mind? Does the reality of an earthquake depend on the presence of a living witness?

Mr. Wauchope is a Theist of some kind. Only God can know the pattern without the things. But since we have to do with an infinity of patterns, all relative to a finite observer, can there be an absolute pattern for the cosmos as a whole?

In the sociological section of his book Mr. Wauchope is severe on planners, and on all agreed-on rules of action. He prefers "charity" to "justice," which began as rules to mitigate revenge and greed. In ideal, justice and charity are fused in a perfect unity, but in actuality justice may be an excuse for cruelty.

Mr. Wauchope's book ends with a curious allegory. It needs a lot of faith to look for a Utopia, in which the lights are more observable than the shadows, as the fruit of an "amoral" dictatorship over an "amoral" people. Nietzsche wanted his future aristocracy of "higher men" to live joyous "amoral" lives, but he considered morality, even Christian morality, necessary for the masses if they were to submit themselves to the exploitation needed to prevent the final biological and social degradation of all mankind. Mr. Wauchope thinks that universal do-as-you-like behaviour, including (one supposes) an occasional beating-up of any one who does as you don't like, will prove humanity's salvation. His recipe of "amoralism"—to judge by the lessons of experience—is more likely to strew the world with Belsen Camps and finally to wreck it with an abuse of atomic energy.

A. D. HOWELL SMITH

Charles Freer Andrews. By BENARSIDAS CHATURVEDI and MARJORIE SYKES. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 334 pp. 1949. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

"The *Life of Christ* (which Charles Freer Andrews had long intended to write in response to the wishes of a large number of his friends) had never been written; it had been, most faithfully, lived." Thus the two authors, one Indian and the other English—symbolical, indeed, of true Indo-British co-operation—conclude their story of the life of one of the most Christlike characters in modern times. For to live Christ is to consecrate oneself to cultivating Friendship with All, which is the noblest of all religions.

From one point of view, Andrews's life was an illuminated illustration of the Biblical text and truth, "I have called ye friends," because this minister of reconciliation between estranged and aggrieved individuals and organisations, communities and creeds, was ever on the alert to befriend oppressed and afflicted orphan humanity. He was, however, of the prophetic type as against the priestly, with a marked "human touch" in his approach to persons and problems. He knew the supreme art of loving, and living with, others; also its twin,—a rarity among professional peacemakers—the art of building "above the deep intent, the deed, the deed."

The story, written with genuine sympathy born of affection and insight, traces the various influences, ranging from the religious atmosphere of the home through some of the teachers at college to companionship with some of the choicest spirits of India—Rudra, of St. Stephen's College, Delhi; his Urdu teacher, Maulvi Zaka Ullah, Munshi Ram of the Gurukula, Kangri, Tagore and Gandhiji (who spoke of his more-than-blood-brother and friend Charlie, as one who was "love incarnate"), which led gradually to the "rebirth" of the Englishman and the churchman into a lover of God in whom the Jew and the Gentile are made one, as well as into an instrument of world-wide concord and compassion. Hence, Andrews's one lifelong yearning was "to remove from the fair name of Christ the racial reproach." For the blighting effect of the imperialism of the West had represented Christ to the East as if he were a Cæsar! Therefore, Andrews revealed in his activities the universal Christ.

There is, however, a certain informatory insufficiency in the chapters dealing with Andrews's efforts to awaken the conscience of the ruling and commercial classes, particularly in several Colonies of the then British Empire, to a realization of the inhumanity and iniquity of their political, social and economic exclusiveness. There is also need for filling in a little more adequately the outlines of the "romance" of Andrews's inner conversion which resulted in the interpretation of the initials of his name, C.F.A., as "Christ's Faithful Apostle." It is to be hoped that the second edition will throw more light on these two points.

G. M.

The Meaning of Human Existence. By LESLIE PAUL. (Faber and Faber, Ltd., London. 259 pp. 1949. 16*s*.)

Mr. Leslie Paul is a man of big titles. His last work was *The Annihilation of Man.* Now we have *The Meaning of Human Existence.* There are two ways in which a book of this kind may be written. It may spring from a man who has had some great spiritual experience, thus adding his authority to the witnesses who have preceded him. Every new book of this kind is welcome. Or he may make a purely intellectual assault and *think* matters out—if he is equipped for the task. Such a book is *The Human Situation* by Macneile Dixon, an intellectual giant whose mind moved with astonishing freedom across all the provinces of knowledge. Mr. Leslie Paul's approach is also purely intellectual. Unfortunately he is unequipped for his task. It would be extremely difficult to find a volume with such a pretentious title which more painfully displays the author's ignorance. Especially ignorance of anthropology and the evolution of religion through the ages. This is a hopeless handicap.

On getting down to it we find that his volume turns out to be another Christian apology, and, in spite of his enormous theme, his references and quotations come almost wholly from the popular apologists of our day. Now there is only one possible way by which a writer can bring new life to Christianity as *the* revelation, and that is by the sweep of a great style borne on the wings of passionate conviction, together with the scholastic equipment ready to meet the arguments and facts of those who, taking into account the findings of the anthropologists, point out that the Christian story does not differ in any essential from a host of similar stories and claims all over the world throughout early history. Mr. Leslie Paul is ill-equipped for this task in every way, and will probably not make many converts in the West, while the East is not likely to be impressed by a writer who obviously thinks that a man like Rabindranath Tagore, say, is less well off with regard to knowledge of God than a Christian.

JOHN STEWART COLLIS

From Euclid to Eddington: A Study of Conceptions of the External World. By SIR EDMUND WHITTAKER. F. R. S. (Cambridge University Press. 212 pp. 1949. 15*s*.)

This volume, a record of the distinguished author's Tarner Lectures at Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1947, constitutes what is probably the most vivid and readable survey so far written of the progressive development of the concepts and principles of physics from classical times to the researches of today.

Here is an evolution of thought in the field of natural philosophy laid out with clarity and authority, for which the student of physics and the interested intellectual general reader will, each in his separate way, be grateful. For the former the logical assembly of the whole story "up to date" provides the essential background so necessary, in these days of intense specialisation, to whatever may be the special field in which his work may lie. As for the latter, the repercussions of physics on philosophy, and of philosophy on physics have reached such a stage that it has now become almost an

essential for the thinking public to know what is the general trend of modern scientific thought. After all, the structure of matter and the scheme of the Universe are fundamental enough, whether one's interest lies in these actual problems for their own sake, or in their repercussions upon and applications to the problems of philosophy, and their attendant problems of human conduct.

The test of the book is perhaps more severe for the general reader than for the student of science. The pace of progress, leisurely as it was through the centuries, has quickened almost beyond belief in the past half-century. It cannot be followed without considerable concentration of thought. But for those who are prepared to make the mental effort the reward is rich, even though the uninitiated may have to skip some of the mathematics. The author has clearly been at pains to reduce this to a minimum, though it was impossible to eliminate it completely. Especially is this so in the very important Section on quantum mechanics.

IVOR B. HART

Matter, Mind and Meaning. By WHATELY CARINGTON. (Methuen and Co., Ltd., London. 257 pp. 1949. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

He who would build up a philosophical system by dematerialising matter, and despiritualising simultaneously the human soul, is likely to fall between the stools! And Carington has certainly so fallen in his attempt to find a generalised conceptual framework which will introduce a meaningful pattern into the vast mass of disconnected facts of psychic research. Our author wields the sledge-hammer of the Logical Positivist to pulverise the entire edifice of metaphysics. "None of them," says he, referring to the metaphysicians, "are either right or wrong: the conclusions of all of them are necessarily meaningless and void."

Next, matter and mind come under fire. There is no *Ding an sich.* "All materialists err in supposing that whatever it is that exists is necessarily matter...." Matter is neither material nor mental, but neutral. The Self or Ego is non-existent and, as for mind, well,

> mind is a kind of *witches' cauldron* of psychons, to which new ingredients are perpetually being added in the form of, as we say, new experiences, and perpetually throwing up fresh configurations of assorted bits and pieces to the surface (field of consciousness)—with the all-important reservation, of course, that there is no cauldron, and (so far as I know) no witches.

Standing in the midst of the shambles he has created, Carington struggles in vain to create a philosophy of neutral monism. The book is the outcome of philosophic frustration. He who has moved in the realm of Telepathy should have shaken himself free of Semanticism and Positivism, which are but regressions from idealism. The true and natural crown and culmination of psychic research are Yoga and Vedanta which Carington failed to reach up to because of his Western Samskara. The book should be read by every student of philosophy as it shows up the futility of all philosophic speculation not grounded in spirituality.

P. S. NAIDU

Concerning Science. By F. SHERWOOD TAYLOR, PH.D., M.A., B.SC. (Macdonald and Co. (Publishers) Ltd., London. 137 pp. 1949. 6*s.*)

By a foremost philosopher and almost startlingly simple, this book is interesting for its definition of modern science as seen by the historian. In a section entitled "What Is Not Science" the author discriminates between emotion, perception and the attempted accuracy of the scientific approach.

An attempt, in parts a trifle obvious, is made to explain the interconnection of science in its various branches but it is hardly possible in a short book to complete such a task.

Speaking of character, Dr. Taylor says that the scientific method of tackling juvenile crime is to place potential criminals in circumstances where they will not need to steal or murder, while admitting that the older method of trying to alter the man so that he would refrain from stealing probably made a better man. Is it seriously suggested that modern psychology makes no attempt to alter specific urges which are criminally antisocial? So crude a description of technical methods is hardly in accordance with discovery. Nor is science, we hope, so vain in materialistic knowledge that it needs, under the heading of raw materials, to explain that the supply of water of high purity is one of the most important achievements of science and later to state that Mechanical Engineering is concerned chiefly with the making of machinery.

The chapter dealing with the dates at which various scientific ideas were generally accepted is, perhaps, one of the most attractive features in a book which students will find of real service. For example :—

> The sun is much larger than the earth and is a mass of glowing gas.—300 B.C.
>
> The heart is a pump which circulates the blood.—1675.
>
> The Universe is more than a million years old and probably at least 3,000 million years old.—1935.

These and many other facts are succinctly given.

Science, says the author, cannot explain or deny human freedom of will. In the "Scope of the Scientific Explanation of the World" the writer is at his best. A far-seeing and thoughtful section which is a delight to read. In "Reason and Science" it is made clear that criticism of Religions cannot be undertaken by the use of laws which do not apply. This and the pattern of the earth's mystery should give science pause before childishly accepting a materialistic universe, as if man were able to explain all that he saw.

In a short Preface we read that a wise man is "he who can understand, value, order and control things, including himself, his social relationships and the irrational creation." If this be an agreed definition, how true that no one is wise! What, incidentally, is irrational creation and in respect of whom is the irrationality?

A. M. Low

The Creed of Buddha. By EDMOND HOLMES. (The Bodley Head, London. 260 pp. 3rd impression, 1949. 7*s.* 6*d.*); *The World As I See It.* By ALBERT EINSTEIN; translated by ALAN HARRIS. (Thinker's Library, Watts and Co., London. 112 pp. 3rd impression, 1949. 2*s.* 6*d.*)

That a reprint of Edmond Holmes's book is timely, that its cogent exposi-

tion of Buddha's teachings is as badly needed in the West today as at any time since its first appearance in 1908, is evident from the recent naïve generalizations of an eminent American missionary, Dr. Laubach, who is to lecture up and down England this coming autumn on the need for the dissemination of Christian "literature" in the East:—

> Buddhism is such a gentle and kindly religion that it is not as easy [with the Siamese] as in Africa to demonstrate the superiority of Christianity over their native religion....A Christlike person is burning with zeal to help other people, as Jesus did every moment of his life. The perfect Buddhist, on the other hand, is concerned with achieving perfection within himself; and he exceeds the requirements of his religion when he makes great effort to help others....

If a copy of Edmond Holmes's book (or at least of its last chapter, "Light from the East") could be distributed among Dr. Laubach's auditors, together with a copy of the New Testament (or at least the Sermon on the Mount) many well-meaning quasi-Christians might thereby become enlightened. To complete their initiation they might be reminded of George Borrow's saying, that "even a Hottentot would share his last morsel with his companions," and thereby realise that mutual help in material matters—common to savages, animists, Buddhists, heathens, Christians and pagans—has little to do with such religions of inwardness as Buddhism and Christianity—which, as Edmond Holmes points out, are virtually identical when stripped of dogma and orthodoxy.

In its original form (published in England fourteen years ago) Einstein's book included essays "on relativity and cognate subjects." Their omission from the present reprint is excused on the ground that its object "is simply to reveal to the general reader the human side of one of the dominating figures of our day." In an age when poets play at politics and novelists play the part of priests it is perhaps inevitable that an eminent scientist should want to air his views on "progress, peace, war, liberty, or other problems of universal interest." Nevertheless Einstein without Relativity does seem a little like *Hamlet* without the Prince of Denmark.

J. P. HOGAN

The Panchatantra. Translated from the Sanskrit by ARTHUR W. RIDER. (403 pp. 1949); *Light of Asia* and *The Indian Song of Songs* (*Gita-Govinda*). By SIR EDWIN ARNOLD. (229 pp. 1949). (Jaico Publishing House, Bombay and Calcutta)

The grain is not easy to winnow from the chaff in the *Panchatantra's* widely travelled animal fables. Lofty sentiments rub shoulders with worldly wisdom; ethical precepts are enunciated, tongue in cheek; but the humour is delightful.

The second book brings together Sir Edwin Arnold's inspiring poem on the Buddha's life and his expurgated translation of the famous Sanskrit love lyric of the twelfth-century Jayadeva, claimed to be allegorical, but full of sensuous beauty and emotional appeal.

E. M. H.

Plato's Life and Thought. By R. S. BLUCK, M.A. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., London. 200 pp. 1949. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

Mr. Bluck's volume, while not too elaborate, yet manages within a couple of hundred pages to give a reasonably adequate survey both of Plato the man and Plato the philosopher. And it possesses one special merit—a translation of the famous Seventh Letter which most critics now regard as genuine.

Part I is a compact and interesting account of Plato's life, containing notices of the philosopher's visits to Sicily. In Part II, Chapter I is on the early Dialogues, largely Socratic in their presentation, such as "Lysis," "Laches" and "Charmides." Whether it is right to include the "Apology" among these early efforts seems to me doubtful.

The chapter on the origin of the Ideal theory is, partly owing to compression, rather difficult to follow.

The four great central Dialogues—"Phædo," the "Republic," the "Symposium" and "Phædrus," seem to me to be the crown of all Plato's written work, giving as they do evidence of artistry, as well as power in the dialectic field. They are most helpfully expounded here. If the "Symposium" is the most brilliant of the dialogues, "Phædo" the most moving and the "Republic" in some ways the most germinal, "Phædrus" is one of the most beautiful; and we are glad to find Mr. Bluck disinclined to place that dialogue among Plato's early works; it could not have been written by a very young man: its thought lies too deep; its insight is too great; it reveals the hand of a consummate master. It is curious to remember that Plato himself set no high value on the "written word," urging that only by verbal discussion could satisfactory answers be given to problems arising in any true philosophic quest. Books, he would say, cannot answer questions. But, apart from his published works, his philosophic investigations might never have survived the lapse of time, but have passed over into some vague tradition.

The influence of Pythagoreanism on Plato is undoubted; it may have increased with the years; but whether it was an unmixed blessing is perhaps questionable. Now we have to recollect that Platonism, though primarily based on the life and example and teaching of Socrates (his true master), was, in its unfoldings, multiform: it was no rigid system. Pythagoras had contacts with the East; Plato had himself travelled eastward—possibly to Phœnicia; he was acquainted with the theories and fancies of the Ionic Schools. Is it too much to say that he must have heard rumours of other religious and philosophic systems current in the Far East, which had occupied the thought of great thinkers, and held their place for centuries, and this mainly in India?

The impact of those Eastern systems must have been felt. It cannot be overlooked. This has been touched on, though barely, in the present volume. But much more is needed, if we are to become cognisant of the real facts. Thus we find things in the Platonic corpus that suggest affinities with Eastern cults, especially with teachings in the Vedanta. There is, for example, the great myth in the "Phædrus," to which a close parallel may be found in one of the Upanishads; and Plato, in

the same dialogue, is but affirming the doctrine, held by rational Brahmanism, that the soul is immortal both retrospectively and prospectively. Sankara declares that THOU and I are opposed as light and darkness; does not Plato speak, in somewhat similar terms, of nonentity and real entity? Unless I am mistaken, metempsychosis has no place in the Mantra sections of the Vedas; and the doctrine never seems to have been general in Greece or Rome: yet Plato believed in it. Can it be that certain overtones he had heard during his travels held firmly in his memory? The subtle penetrating influences of the Vedanta on Western theologies, in the pre-Christian world, have never been adequately understood. They would repay investigation.

We gladly note that Mr. Bluck holds that the Platonic Socrates cannot be identified with the historic. Enough to mention, in passing, that the subject-matter of the "Phædo" is non-Socratic. Is it too much to assert that Xenophon gives us the real, Plato the idealized, Socrates—just as we find, in the New Testament, that the Johannine Gospel presents us with the mystical, idealized Jesus, whereas the Synoptics deal—in the main—with the historic Jesus?

Probably the least satisfactory part of this book is the Bibliography, which omits several valuable aids to Platonic study.

E. H. BLAKENEY

Hindu View of Christ. By SWAMI AKHILANANDA. (Philosophical Library, New York. 291 pp. 1949. $3.00)

This book, presenting Christ as one of many Divine Incarnations, is an outstanding contribution to the unity of religions, though chapter headings like "Christ, A Yogi" may shock the orthodox. Not only is the approach broad; the book is stimulating to aspiration and to reverence for human greatness. Swami Akhilananda defends religion without ignoring the abuses in its name. He makes an admirable stand against dividing life between secular and spiritual and stresses ethics and mental integration, brotherly love and non-violence and the spirit of renunciation.

The treatment ignores reincarnation to a degree surprising in a work by an exponent of Hinduism, and Karma fares scarcely better. For that majestic concept is vitiated by the suggestion that the law of cause and effect can be nullified by Grace—a proposition not easy to distinguish from the dangerous fiction of vicarious atonement.

Miracles are rightly repudiated, seeming miracles being possible with knowledge of "laws of the mind," but it is not made clear that the ancient Indian teachings are scientific and philosophical as well as religious, and that detailed knowledge of the human constitution and the various states of consciousness, as also of psychic and spiritual powers, is therein set forth.

The stress on a Personal God and on emotional relationship with "Him" is the book's chief drawback. Meditation on the Impersonal Absolute (the crown of ancient Indian thought) is mentioned as an intellectual approach, unsuitable for average individuals.

But not through mere yearning for God-realisation, even with the addition of brotherly service, is the goal of self-conscious perfection, with mastery of the forces in man as in Nature, to be achieved. "He who is perfected in devotion," says the *Gita*, "findeth spiritual knowledge springing up spontaneously in himself in the progress of time." (IV. 38) But devotion is not emotion; its perfection calls for the disciplining and development of mind as well as heart.

E. M. H.

Katherine Mansfield and Other Literary Portraits. By JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY. (Peter Nevill, Ltd., London. 242 pp. 1949. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

Sympathy and the capacity to enter fully into the moods of one's subject distinguish the real critic from dabblers in that art. It is an art which, curiously enough, in the present age has suffered neglect. But in Mr. Murry we still have one of those critics who handle their subject with such delicate mastery of touch that the reader, far from being tempted to skip pages, rejoices anew in the beauty and delight of æsthetic communication.

The portrait of Katherine Mansfield begins with a challenge to her critics—a challenge which expands into a warm and sensitive appreciation of a fine writer. We are shown not merely the artist at her work but also the splendid spirit of a woman who, even under the stress of physical suffering, could still see the principle of beauty in all things. One of the finest and most gifted writers of the early twentieth century, Katherine Mansfield in these pages written by one who knew her best, now comes triumphantly into her own.

The essays on De Quincey and Arnold, Coleridge and Wordsworth remind us afresh of the Mr. Murry who wrote *Keats and Shakespeare*. Imaginary Conversations, even though they were popular at one time, thanks to Landor, cannot, by their very nature, but be slightly strained and artificial but Mr. Murry's Conversation between Keats and Coleridge rarely smacks of artificiality. The exquisitely homely portrait of Thomas Hardy is one of the best in this collection of essays, and the art of literary criticism has a splendid tribute paid to it in the essay on A. C. Bradley, a name familiar to all students of literature.

> Criticism for Bradley could never be automatic. On the contrary it was, as he practised it, one of the severest conceivable exercises of the soul....He offered no short-cuts to the acquisition of a method; he demanded of those who would follow him not only the primary endowment of the creative artist but also the intellectual capacity to discriminate an experience to its elements and the moral will be satisfied with nothing less than a complete interpretation of it.

To use Bradley's own words: "To feel one's way into the poet's mind."

Mr. Murry says that Bradley is difficult to imitate. But then is imitation necessary? One of the most discerning and imaginative of present-day critics, Mr. Murry is perhaps as difficult to imitate as the great Shakespearian critic. All lovers of English literature will find in this volume the art of true literary criticism as revealed by a master of that art.

KAMALA D. NAYAR

My little book, *The Popes and Social Problems*, briefly but kindly reviewed in your June issue, was written in 1946-7, when I was outside the Catholic Church but thinking of seeking to return. I returned in March, 1948, but it was then too late to make some modifications of expression in the book—which, though not published till 1949, was in type. I think, however, that the main contention of it (namely, that between Catholicism and much modern ideology there is a definite and deadly conflict) is clearly true. I would now side with Catholicism.

London. J. W. POYNTER

ENDS AND SAYINGS

" _____ ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

Several Delegates, returning from the World Pacifist Meetings at Santiniketan and Sevagram, spoke at the Town Hall, Bombay, on January 5th, under the auspices of the P.E.N. All-India Centre and the presidency of Shrimati Sophia Wadia, substituting for the Mayor, whose official duties made it impossible for him to preside as arranged.

The Conference had found no final solutions, but the Delegates from 35 countries had derived encouragement and strength from meeting, and from coming to the India of Gandhiji. They had come away more than ever convinced of the vast influence of his ideals, and of the potency of non-violent resistance for the realization of enduring peace. Mr. Richard Gregg was sure that Gandhiji's influence would be the stronger in all parts of the world for these meetings; his scheme of Basic Education could be usefully adopted in many countries. ULu Pe Win, Minister for Archæology and a Vice-President of the All-Burma Buddhist Organization, was convinced that only truth and non-violence as taught by Gandhiji could lead to the lasting peace of which his country was in such sore need.

The key position of the individual in the peace problem was recognized by more than one speaker. Mr. Yrjo Kallinen, Defence Minister of Finland from 1945-48, declared that no system could guarantee peace if human beings were not ready for peace. So long as men were easily irritated and full of self-assertion, so long was there no certainty of peace under any system. He put little faith in organizations or in officials who, he said, "could do much harm but very little good."

The optimism of the South African Delegate, in the face of the great difficulties, was heartening. Coming from a country where "peace was the last thing thought of," Mr. David Don Tengo Jabavu had faith in the coming of world peace. Woman suffrage in Britain and Indian independence had in his lifetime seemed equally unlikely, but they had come.

Mr. Gregg had mentioned the Buddha's and Jesus' teaching that evil could be overcome only by good, and the Chairman ended on that note, declaring that the way for India was neither aggressive orthodoxy nor Communism, both of which tendencies were trying to assert themselves in this country, but action in accordance with what the Buddha had called "the law eternal," that "Hatred ceases not by hatred, but by love."

A call for a reorientation of values to fit democracy for the newer and more comprehensive tasks of today was sounded by Sir C.P. Ramaswami Aiyar in his Inaugural Address at the Twelfth Indian Political Science Conference, which met at Madras on 29th December. In his masterly survey of the problems facing the new Indian

Nation, against the background of the traditional Indian polity and attitude of tolerance and the present world situation, he emphasized the need of reconciling with democracy the centralization of power under the new Constitution and what was *de facto* a one-party organization. The dangers of totalitarianism on the one hand and of centrifugal tendencies on the other both had to be avoided. There was danger of confusing the good of the majority with the common good. What was necessary was such a "spiritual transformation of human relationships" as would prevent the stifling by society of individual initiative, lest we fall prey to what had been termed the "creeping paralysis of conformity."

"Democracy," he declared, "will succeed only in proportion to the character of the people who have evolved it." It would decay if the tendency was either to aggression or to conformity. It had, he believed, been grasped that "the cure for the ills of economic progress is not merely more economic progress," but in many parts of the world the environment had become "physically sordid and morally mediocre."

In addition to the four freedoms, the biggest liberation would seem to consist in the escape from a purely mechanistic conception of life....The supersession of racial and national barriers and the growth of tolerance must be the inspirations of the political science of the immediate future if the "things that are more excellent" in human life and aspiration are to be salvaged from the maelstrom that threatens to engulf us.

India is to be congratulated on the formation at Madras on December 18th of the Indian Rationalists' Association. A body of freethinkers, vigilant and vocal, can be of great assistance in holding the people in practice to the ideal of the secular State. Shri S. Ramanathan, Chairman of the Reception Committee, rightly maintained that in a secular State there must be complete disestablishment of religion, *i. e.*, that no religion may be given a privileged position, be considered the State religion and look to the Government for its support.

We stand strongly for non-sectarian education and warmly agree with the President, Sir R. P. Paranjpye, that "education must train young people to think for themselves and form their own opinions." Provided "dogmatic" be substituted for "religious" in their Resolution, we should agree with our Rationalist friends that such instruction "should not form part of the education imparted in any educational institution." But only on that proviso. For religion in its essential nature is what it means by derivation—"that which binds back," *i. e.*, binds all men and beings into the common unity in which they are rooted and from which they have sprung. The larger vision than the egocentric or the communal or even the national has to be imparted to our youth as citizens of the world; and that can be done and they can be saved from the aridity of exclusive concern with material things by the impartial presentation of the truths and ethics which form the common core of all religious teachings as originally given out.